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ABSTRACT: Philosophers of science have had little to say about ‘middle-range theory’ although much of what is done in sci-
ence and of what drives its successes falls under that label. These lectures aim to spark an interest in the topic and to lay ground-
work for further research on it. ‘Middle’ in ‘middle range’ is with respect to the level both of abstraction and generality. Much mid-
dle-range theory is about things that come under the label ‘mechanism’. The lectures explore three different kinds of mechanism: 
structural mechanisms or underlying systems that afford causal pathways; causal-chain mechanisms that are represented in what in 
policy contexts are called ‘theories of change’ and for which I give an extended account following the causal process theory of Wes-
ley Salmon; and middle-range-law mechanisms like those discussed by Jon Elster, which I claim are —and rightly are— rampant 
throughout the social sciences. The theory of the democratic peace, that democracies do not go to war with democracies, serves 
as a running example. The discussions build up to the start of, first, an argument that reliability in social (and natural) science de-
pends not so much on evidence as it does on the support of a virtuous tangle of practices (without which there couldn’t even be evi-
dence), and second, a defence of a community-practice centred instrumentalist understanding of many of the central basic principles 
that we use (often successfully) in social (and in natural) science for explanation, prediction and evaluation.
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RESUMEN: Los filósofos de la ciencia han tenido poco que decir acerca de la “teoría de rango medio”, aunque gran parte de lo que 
se hace en la ciencia y de lo que impulsa sus éxitos cae bajo esa etiqueta. Estas conferencias tienen como objetivo despertar el interés en el 
tema y sentar las bases para la ulterior investigación al respecto. “Medio” en “rango medio” hace referencia al nivel de abstracción y ge-
neralidad. Gran parte de la teoría de rango medio trata sobre cosas que caen bajo la etiqueta de “mecanismo”. Las conferencias exploran 
tres tipos diferentes de mecanismos: mecanismos estructurales o sistemas subyacentes que permiten vías causales; mecanismos de cadena 
causal que están representados en lo que en contextos de política se denominan “teorías de cambio” y sobre los cuales doy una explicación 
extensa siguiendo la teoría del proceso causal de Wesley Salmon; y mecanismos de ley de rango medio como los discutidos por Jon Elster, 
que afirmo son, y con razón son, rampantes en todas las ciencias sociales. La teoría de la paz democrática, que las democracias no van a 
la guerra con las democracias, sirve como un ejemplo en funcionamiento. Las discusiones se desarrollan hasta el comienzo de, primero, 
un argumento según el que la confiabilidad en las ciencias sociales (y naturales) no depende tanto de la evidencia como del apoyo de una 
maraña virtuosa de prácticas (sin las cuales ni siquiera podría haber evidencia), y en segundo lugar, una defensa de una comprensión 
instrumentalista, centrada en la práctica comunitaria, de muchos de los principios básicos centrales que usamos (a menudo con éxito) en 
ciencias sociales (y naturales) para explicar, predecir y evaluar.
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Lecture 1. Markers, mechanisms & measures
Middle-range theories —the only game in town
These lectures aim to get you excited about middle-range theories. We have little philosoph-
ical understanding of what they are, what they do or of how they do what they do. This de-
spite the fact that middle-range theorising is ubiquitous in the social, economic and health 
sciences.1 There’s good practical reason why it is so widespread: if we are concerned with 
explaining, predicting or managing the world in these domains, middle-range theories are 
generally the only game in town.
Middle-range theory is everywhere in the social sciences, including economics, which 
is notorious for its use of abstract, mathematised general theories. Philosopher/historian 
Mary Morgan provides a nice example of this in her paper ‘The Curious Case of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma’, where she notes, ‘Game thinking has introduced a form of reasoning into 
economics that adds case-based reasoning onto more generalizing kinds of theory’ (Mor-
gan, 2007, p. 61). Game theory models are examples of middle-range theorising par excel-
lence.
What though is ‘middle-range theory’? The term was made popular by the sociolo-
gist Robert Merton in the 1940s. By now it means many different things to many different 
people. We will get a better sense of some of the important scientific endeavours that fall 
under this label as these lectures proceed, but for a start you can think of them as the sociol-
ogists Peter Hedström and Lars Udehn describe. Middle-range theory is
… a clear, precise, and simple type of theory which can be used for partially explaining a range of 
different phenomena, but which makes no pretense of being able to explain all social phenom-
ena… It is a vision of sociological theory as a toolbox of semigeneral theories each of which is 
adequate for explaining a limited range or type of phenomena. …[Merton’s] vision has more in 
common with the type of theories found in the life sciences than with those found in the phys-
ical sciences. Contemporary biologists, for example, do not seek to develop general law-like the-
ory but aim at identifying middle-range theory in Merton’s sense of the term. (Bearman and 
 Hedström, 2011, p. 31)
A lot of middle-range theory goes under the label ‘mechanism’. This will be one of the cen-
tral themes of these lectures. ‘Mechanism’ is a term that is used in a great variety of ways 
both in philosophy and across the sciences. I am going to sort out three distinct kinds of 
mechanism that play a significant role in middle-range theorising in social science. First 
are structural mechanisms, which I shall discuss here in Lecture 1. This is a sense of ‘mech-
anism’ familiar to philosophers from work in the last two decades in the philosophy of bi-
ology. Second are causal-chain mechanisms. Starting with the process/interaction theory 
of Wesley Salmon Lecture 2 will develop an account of what a good mechanistic theory 
of this kind should be like. The third, which I turn to in Lecture 3, are middle-range-law 
mechanisms. These may be familiar to philosophers from the work of Jon Elster (2015, 
p. 56), who talks of social and psychological mechanisms, which often come in ‘opposing 
pairs, like the endowment effect, in which “a memory of a good experience is a good mem-
1 It is also, in my view, in physics as well. But I will not defend that here.
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ory” and the “experience of a bad [memory] is a bad memory” suggests opposite outcomes 
to those of the contrast effect, in which memories of past experiences have an opposing ef-
fect on present experiences.’
I am going to use as a running example of a middle-range theory the theory of the dem-
ocratic peace (DPT) —that democracies do not go to war with democracies. Democratic 
peace theorising is a rich, variegated activity with a great many interlocking endeavours of 
various kinds, some of which I shall review.
Middle-range theorising comes in a variety of forms, involving a variety of practices 
serving a variety of purposes. I can illustrate using some slides lent to me by Sabina Leo-
nelli from her 2018 Lakatos Award lecture at the London School of Economics. The first 
( Figure 1) shows a cycle of activities that go into knowledge creation in the sciences. Leo-
nelli’s second slide (Figure 2) points out that theorising is required for all of them. And, I 
add, by far and away the bulk of this theorising will be middle range. These lectures will fo-
cus on just a few of these. Today, in Lecture 1 I am going first to introduce you to mark-
ers that middle-range theories like the democratic peace can provide for us. Markers are 
characteristics, like democracy, by which we identify systems that support or, alternatively, 
discourage causal pathways we are concerned about, like the route from tension to war. 
Second, I am going to provide a philosophic framework for one kind of middle-range the-
orising that I have looked at in some detail: the construction and defence of measures for 
theoretical concepts.
Figure 1
Leonelli (2019, p. 22)
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Figure 2
Leonelli (2019, p. 22)
The topic of Lecture 2 is theories of change and causal-chain models. Lecture 3 turns to 
mechanisms in the middle-range law sense. These are rife in the social sciences. Yet they 
seem far too loose to make for good science, especially since, as Elster notes, many point 
in opposite directions. Elster himself says that, though they are useful for explanation, 
they will not serve for prediction. But if they are so loose that we cannot use them for 
prediction, why suppose they can participate in credible explanation? I shall argue that 
explanations employing Elster-type middle-range laws can be credible —if they are em-
bedded in a thick, tangled net of middle-range practices like that we find in democratic 
peace theorising.
What works: making sure your policies deliver what you want
Much of my recent work has been in the philosophy of social technology: on how to use 
scientific and local knowledge to build better societies, with special focus on better policies 
and better predictions about policy outcomes. This is how I came to middle-range theory. 
I’ll start there with you too.
I began this work because I was disturbed by the evidence-based-policy (EBP) move-
ment, which is very vocal in the US and the UK as well as in various international organisa-
tions (like the World Bank’s Open Knowledge Repository). For instance, the UK now has 
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nine expensive ‘What Works’ Centres, and in the US what counts as “scientifically-based 
research in education” was written into Federal law in the ‘Castle’ Bill of 2002,2 which sets 
the standards for the US Department of Education’s What Works Clearinghouse. I was 
disturbed on two counts.
First is the very narrow range of scientific work these EBP sites take on board. Most 
set themselves the task of vetting, summarising and disseminating the ‘evidence’ about how 
good the policies or ‘interventions’ they review are at producing their targeted outcomes. 
EBP institutions do so in order to help policy makers make better decisions about what 
policies to implement. But their notion of ‘evidence’ is highly restrictive. It does not cross 
the range of credible scientific knowledge. Rather, almost everywhere EBP has concerned 
itself with policing the quality of empirical studies, and a very narrow kind of empirical 
study at that. The focus is almost entirely on studies designed to look directly at whether 
specified inputs produce targeted outputs in study populations, and within those, on stud-
ies that make statistical group comparisons, whether randomised controlled trials (RCTs), 
which are the gold standard across EBP, or observational studies comparing groups where 
the input occurred versus ones where it did not.
This restriction on the scientific knowledge base and on the kind of scientific endeav-
our that is licensed is generally defended on the grounds that a causal claim must be estab-
lished by establishing a counterfactual. To this is added the claim that it is impossible to 
establish a counterfactual for a single individual since we cannot look to see both what hap-
pens if that individual is subject to the input and if not. But in a good RCT design we can 
at least get an unbiased estimate of what happens in two groups where the input is inde-
pendent of other causal factors, and that’s what they advocate. But note: this is one big step 
removed from establishing a well-formed counterfactual. At best3 what an RCT warrants 
is that a counterfactual of the right form holds for some members of the study population; 
it does not establish any specific counterfactual. So at best the conclusion can be: for some-
body in the study population, the specified input produced the targeted output.
We philosophers have had a lot to say, pro and con, about causes and counterfactuals. 
What I want to note here is that, even if we assume that causal claims amount to counter-
factual claims,4 it does not follow that causal/counterfactual claims must be established by 
such a direct line of argument. Depending on what we assume about causality and what we 
take to be known about the type of situation at hand, there are a large variety of ways of es-
tablishing a causal claim and thereby —if one assumes the equation of causes with counter-
factuals— a counterfactual. But ‘what we take to be known’ will involve a great deal more 
than study results of the kind EBP majors in. In particular, it will involve ‘middle-range’ 
theory.
My second shock in engaging with EBP was with the exceedingly sloppy language em-
ployed throughout. According to conventional EBP wisdom, by careful review of the re-
search evidence we can learn “What Works” and (setting aside questions of cost and cul-
tural and moral acceptability) that is what policy makers should implement.
2 For an account of the federal legislation here see Eisenhart and Towne (2003). 
3 ‘At best’ because the RCT result is only an (unbiased) estimate of the true average treatment effect. If 
the true average is greater than zero, it follows that the individual treatment effect, which is defined in 
terms of the individual counterfactual, is positive for at least some individual studied. 
4 Which I do not endorse.
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But: what on earth could “It works” mean? I will here pass over our usual thorny issues 
about causation in general in order to focus on further questions of serious practical conse-
quences. “It works” sounds like a rubric for a general claim: “This policy results in the tar-
geted outcomes generally” or perhaps “… widely” or “…across this domain”, where what 
‘this’ domain is may be more or less clear. That can’t, though, in good faith be right be-
cause of the way these claims are evidenced. They are taken to be well established if one or 
a number of good group comparison studies all show that the policy achieved its targeted 
outcomes in the study populations in the study sites and none show they did not. And this 
without seriously attending to any of our usual worries in philosophy of science about how 
to establish general claims, like cautions about induction by simple enumeration (it worked 
in site 1, it worked in site 2, … so it will work everywhere), the need to ensure we are using 
projectable predicates and so forth.5
Equally under warranted by evidence that the policy has worked in some number of 
study sites is the usual advice given to policy makers: this policy works, so use it. But of 
course everyone recognises that the fact that a policy worked in some places is poor guar-
antee that it will work in this new place: “Context matters.” This has now become a famil-
iar slogan in the EBP community. We should, we are now told, not just ask “What works?” 
but “What works, for whom, where.” The problem is that the science condoned in EBP is 
not up to the job of answering that.
But middle-range theory can help. That’s why I became interested in it. In these lec-
tures I shall investigate various types of scientific work reasonably labelled ‘middle-range’ 
theory that can support causal prediction, exploring how they work and some of the prob-
lems in their use. Today I start at the deep end— literally, with social substructures, be-
cause that is what in the end determines what can cause what.
Context matters
‘What Works, for whom, where?’ Answers to this come in the form of conditional general 
claims, although not always explicitly so formulated. Here are three typical cases that I have 
studied.
— ‘Rigorous evidence shows that school-based deworming can improve children’s health, 
education, and long-term productivity at an average cost of less than $0.50 per child 
per year’ (italics added).6 This is from the website for Evidence Action, an anti-pov-
erty institution that says of itself: ‘By focusing on promising approaches backed by 
rigorous evidence, we support programs that are measurably effective.’ You may 
have heard of this kind of institution from the ‘Give effectively’ movement.
The italicised phrase sounds like a general claim, one that is presumably meant to hold con-
ditional on at least the fact that the children are in areas affected by parasitic worms since 
5 For a discussion of this problem see Cartwright and Hardie (Oxford University Press, 2012) on 
‘climbing up the ladder of abstraction’, especially the example of the Bangladesh and Tamil Nadu Inte-
grated Nutrition Programmes.
6 The Problem: Parasitic Worms. Evidence Action. Retrieved from https://www.evidenceaction.org/ 
dewormtheworld/#the-problem-of-parasitic-worms
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they tell us:  ‘While virtually non-existent and unheard of in developed countries today, 
parasitic worm infections are endemic in many of the poorest countries in the world.’
— With respect to the effects of the multi-faceted literacy programme Read 180 on 
comprehension: there is ‘Strong evidence of a positive effect with no overriding 
contrary evidence.’7 This is according to The US Department of Education’s In-
stitute of Education Sciences’ What Works Clearing House (WWC), which claims 
of itself: ‘We focus on the results from high-quality research to answer the ques-
tion “What works in education?”’8 The WWC effectiveness ratings, like the one for 
Read 180, are based on ‘the quality of research, the statistical significance of find-
ings, the magnitude of findings, and the consistency of findings across studies’.9
— ‘The Signs of Safety approach provides principles, disciplines and fit-for-purpose 
tools that equip practitioners and supervisors to build observable everyday safety for 
children…’ This, in the realm of child protection, is from the Signs of Safety Com-
prehensive Briefing Paper Turnell, 2019), which explains what Signs of Safety is and 
how and why it should work. This approach is being adopted in many local areas 
in the UK and the Republic of Ireland, following the 2011 Munro Review of Child 
Protection, which identified interventions into the child welfare system that did not 
work to produce better outcomes for children: ‘statutory guidance, targets and local 
rules’, which, the Review maintains ‘have become so extensive that they limit [the] 
ability [of practitioners] to stay child-centred. The demands of bureaucracy have 
reduced their capacity to work directly with children, young people and families… 
Services have become so standardised that they do not provide the required range of 
responses to the variety of need that is presented’ (Munro, 2011).
Whatever one thinks about basic laws of nature, general claims like these about what pol-
icies produce what outcomes are not among them. That’s why context is so critical —the 
where part of ‘What works, for whom, where’ really matters. Ceteris paribus claims like 
these hold some places and not others, and there is a reason for that. They hold because 
there is some underlying structure (sometimes also referred to by the word ‘system’) that 
gives rise to them. They are afforded by the basic materiel, social, economic and cultural ar-
rangements that obtain, and these differ from place to place.
I have called these underlying arrangements ‘socio-economic machines’ or, more gen-
erally, ‘nomological machines’, because they generate law-like (ceteris paribus) regularities. 
Socio-economic machines are akin, in the social realm, to the ‘mechanisms’ that philoso-
phers of biology like Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver (MDC), William 
Bechtel, Stuart Glennan and others cite to explain biological regularities. As Rom Harré ar-
gued already in 1972 different underlying structures afford different causal pathways and 
in consequence, different causal regularities (Harré, 1972). I shall call these kinds of mech-
anisms ‘structural mechanisms’ to distinguish them from other kinds I will discuss in these 
lectures. My standard household example is the toilet and the toaster. Pressing the lever has 
7 WWC Intervention Report. READ 180, November 2016. Retrieved from https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/
wwc/Docs/InterventionReports/wwc_read180_112916.pdf
8 What Works Clearing House. Retrieved from https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/
9 WWC Summary of Evidence for this Intervention. READ 180. Retrieved from https://ies.ed.gov/
ncee/wwc/intervention/742. Accessed 30 March 2019.
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very different outcomes in the two, and that depends on the parts of the underlying struc-
ture, their arrangements and activities.
The same dependence on underlying mechanisms is true for singular causal relations as 
well as for ceteris paribus causal regularities. For most singular causal facts of interest to us 
there is seldom anything in the cause directing it to that effect. This is especially true when 
the cause is a policy intervention and the effect is its targeted outcome, as in my three ex-
amples earlier. In these cases there are long chains of intervening steps. It is the arrange-
ments and activities of the parts of the structure in which the cause operates that allows
— that each step can produce the one that follows and
— the concatenation of the steps to allow the entire process to carry through.
Lecture 2 will discuss these causal chains in some detail. I mention them here to underline 
the idea that, when it comes to claims of practical use in managing the world around us, 
whether we consider a ceteris paribus causal regularity claim or a singular causal prediction 
about what will cause what in a new case (or a retrodiction about what has done so), it is 
the structural features of the context that determine the truth of the claim.
This makes for real problems, for we have no explicit methodology for how to study 
these underlying mechanisms in order to determine what causal pathways they afford. This 
is not to say that we don’t study them. We do, and sometimes we do a very good job of it—
as the studies discussed by the mechanist philosophers of biology witness. Rather, there 
aren’t methods handbooks on it,10 nor are there good accounts of appropriate methodolo-
gies in our own discipline of philosophy of science. What I have come to see in investigat-
ing these problems is that a good deal of middle-range theorising of various sorts is involved 
in our successful endeavours at this. In particular when it comes to the special case of policy 
prediction, middle-range theory can help in two ways:
— It can identify what I label ‘markers’ that pick out structures that will support a 
given causal pathway.
— It can tackle directly the problem of identifying what the central features are of 
those structures that allow them to do so.
These are both topics I shall take up, beginning with the first today and turning to the sec-
ond in Lecture 3, where I discuss Elster-style ‘middle-range-law’ mechanisms.
In earlier work I have emphasised the importance of markers in helping us negotiate 
the world. Markers are easily recognisable signs that allow us to pick out systems that have 
the right structure to support causal pathways of interest without our having to understand 
why—what features and activities allow those systems to do so, as for instance in the visi-
ble differences between acorns and nasturtium seeds. I will illustrate with the case of demo-
cratic peace theory. I pick this example because Sharon Crasnow (2012) has made it famil-
iar in the philosophic literature through her work on case studies and because colleagues 
in international development with whom I have discussed markers have found the demo-
cratic peace to be a helpful example.11
10 Though methods courses on case studies and causal process tracing do bits of the job.
11 See Cartwright et al. (2019). 
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Markers and the case of the democratic peace
Democratic peace theory revolves around the middle-range generalization that democra-
cies do not go to war with democracies. There is widespread agreement that the empirical 
claim is true but considerably less agreement on why, though there are a number of expla-
nations on offer, which we shall look at later. To the extent that this claim is credible, it can 
be useful in explanation, and supposing the democracy mechanism is the principal one that 
will operate, at predicting and planning future actions, for instance in military policy or in-
ternational investment policy.
The claim ‘democracies do not go to war with democracies’ is an example of a mid-
dle-range theory par excellence. It is in the middle with respect to the abstractness of the 
concepts employed and the breadth of the claim’s applicability, i.e. between high social 
theory and more specific social science claims that use more detailed concepts about more 
specifically identified issues. On one side stand broad perspectives: structuralist perspec-
tives (like functionalism and Marxism), interpretivist ones (like interactionism), feminist 
perspectives, New Right perspectives or post modernism, with below these more detailed 
but still ‘grand’ theories like those of Antonio Gramsci, Tony Giddens, Theda Skocpol, 
Pierre Bourdieu, Emil Durkheim, Judith Butler and so forth. On the other side stand 
more specific, descriptive claims, like this typical remark about the Fashoda crisis, an inci-
dent in 1898 that is often cited as a paradigmatic example of the democratic peace in ac-
tion: ‘[T]he French fleet was out-powered by superior British naval prowess and France 
was eager to have Britain’s support in future conflicts against Germany. The reopening of 
the Dreyfus Affair also distracted the French from the Fashoda dispute. Seeing no advan-
tage in a colonial war with Britain, the French ultimately decided to withdraw its soldiers 
from Fashoda...’12
If we are to use ‘democracy pair’ as a policy marker for countries in which tensions do 
not result in war, we better have good reason to think that this application of DPT is accu-
rate, or — accurate enough for this purpose. This is where middle-range theorising comes 
into its own. And elements of the theory itself cast some doubt on this. One school of 
thought accepts that democracies do not go to war with democracies but urges that that 
is not due to the nature of democracy. Democracy is just co-extensional with the genuine 
causes of dyadic peace. For instance, Henry Faber and Joanne Gowa (1995) argue that the 
Cold War largely explains the democratic peace, and Raymond Cohen (1994) argues that 
it is shared culture not democracy that matters, whereas Bruce Russett is at pains to show 
the contrary, that the democratic peace is ‘a result of some features of a democracy, rather 
than caused exclusively by economic or geopolitical characteristics correlated with democ-
racy’ (1994, p. 11), like alliances, political stability or wealth.
This matters to the usefulness of the democracy marker for policy prediction and plan-
ning. For instance, Russett, like many US Presidents (Owen IV, 2005), suggests that US 
efforts to democratise other countries may not be just for democracy for its own sake but 
also to make the world more peaceful. This is in agreement with Sebastian Rosato, who 
in opposition to Russett, claims it is not democracy that matters, though both see the im-
12 Britain and France Face off in the Fashoda Incident. History Channel. Retrieved from https://www.
historychannel.com.au/this-day-in-history/britain-and-france-face-off-in-the-fashoda-incident/. Ac-
cessed 30 March 2019.
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portance of getting the right concept in the claim. As Rosato (2003) argues: ‘Evaluating 
whether the democratic peace finding is caused by democracy or by some other factor such 
as American preponderance has implications far beyond the academy. If peace and security 
are indeed a consequence of shared democracy, then international democratization should 
lie at the heart of American grand strategy. But if, as I have suggested, democracy does not 
cause peace, then American policymakers are expending valuable resources on a policy that, 
while morally praiseworthy, does not make America more secure.’
Co-extensionality does not always cause problems for explanation or prediction of 
course. What matters is whether it breaks down or not in the targeted application. Does it? 
That raises a whole new set of questions. For instance, what is ‘American preponderance’? 
How is it measured? Where can it be relied on? To answer these takes a whole new set 
of research activities, many of which will look outward to new domains that have not yet 
played much of a role in DPT.
In Lecture 3 I shall argue that the credibility of DPT models and predictions comes 
from the virtuous tangle of interlacing practices that make up democratic peace theory—
interlacing both internally and with those of other domains. (Thanks to Alison Wylie for 
the adjective ‘virtuous’.)13 These are all familiar activities, many well studied by philosophy 
of science, a few less so. What is important is to see them in one scheme, as all together what 
constitutes democratic peace theory —or better: theorising.
We philosophers of science have tended to have far too thin a notion of what makes 
for scientific theory, which results in far too narrow accounts of what makes the results of 
our theorising credible. Theory is not a set of propositions, nor a set of models, nor any-
thing of that ilk. It is, as many from the Society for the Philosophy of Science in Practice 
advocate, a rich set of interlocking practices. The credibility of our scientific activities de-
pends on the richness of this set and the interlacing of the activities that make it up—each 
done with a look over the shoulder to the others. In the remainder of these lectures I am 
going to talk about three kinds of activities that go into middle-range theorising that my 
own work has engaged with: Lecture 3 is on the use of Elster-style mechanisms, Lecture 2 is 
on theories of change and causal-chain modelling and in the remainder of today’s lecture I 
am going to look at what it takes to design a good measure.
Designing a measure
I begin with what we philosophers call ‘precisification’.14 As we use the terms in everyday 
language, both ‘democracy’ and ‘war’ are too loose to play a proper role in science. Many so-
cial science concepts seem to refer to specific qualitative or quantitative features that things 
might have, or to sets or functions of these. The number of women refugees in a province, 
the average age of school leavers, the NAIRU (the non-accelerating inflation rate of unem-
ployment), or even just the ‘simple’ unemployment rate are examples. Other concepts sort 
things into categories based on a loose set of criteria where the members of the same cat-
egory do not share any specific set of features but may rather have what Wittgenstein re-
13 Alison Wylie, Conversation, November 2, 2018, Seattle, Washington.
14 On the analogy of found art, Sophia Efstathiou calls these ‘found’ concepts that need to get ‘founded’ 
properly into a science if they are to play a proper role there. See Efstathiou (2012). 
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ferred to as ‘family resemblance’. Concepts with relatively clear evaluative implications, 
such as human welfare, human rights, the quality of PhD programmes or the number of 
people in poverty, generally fall in this category, along with many ‘everyday’ concepts at 
play in the social sciences. ‘Democracy’ and ‘war’ seem to be among these.
I follow Otto Neurath in calling concepts like this Ballungen (‘congestions’),15 as in 
the German “Ballungsgebiet” for a congested urban area with ill-defined edges: there is a 
lot packed into it; there is often no central core without which an item doesn’t merit the 
label; different clusters of features from the congestion (Ballung) can matter for different 
uses; whether a feature counts as in or outside the concept, and how far, is context and use 
dependent. Concepts like this don’t generally make for good science. They are too vague, 
too loose. To use them in a proper social science study they need to be made more precise, 
which is just what must happen to ‘democracy’ and ‘war’. But any concept familiar to gen-
eral society, such as ‘disability’ or ‘poverty’ or ‘functional literacy’, is likely to be a Ballung 
concept with a multifaceted meaning. So in carrying these concepts into social science, 
we must be prepared for both multiplication of concepts and loss of meaning. To preci-
sify concepts like these, we will likely have to sacrifice or alter large chunks of the mean-
ing—what CG Hempel in commenting on Rudolf Carnap’s notion of explication has 
called ‘alienation’ of the concept: ‘An explication sentence does not simply exhibit the 
commonly accepted meaning of the concept under study but rather proposes a specified 
new and precise meaning for it’ (Hempel, 1952, p. 663) … ‘At present, in fact, the connec-
tion between the technical and the pre-scientific meaning of theoretical terms has become 
quite tenuous in many instances, but the gain achieved by this “alienation” has been an 
enormous increase in the scope, simplicity, and experiential confirmation of scientific theo-
ries’ (Hempel, 1952, p. 701).
That brings us to the question of just what goes into designing and defending measures. 
This is a question I have worked on with Norman Bradburn, who is a pioneer in social in-
dicators and quality of life research, and Jonathan Fuller, who is both a medical doctor and 
a philosopher of medicine (Cartwright et al., 2017). Together we have developed a tripar-
tite theory of measurement.
Measurement, we argue, is not just assigning categories or numbers; it is assigning val-
ues in a systematic and grounded way. It requires
1. A characterisation of the concept or quantity, which includes identifying its 
boundaries and fixing which features belong to it and which do not (characterisa-
tion).
2. A metrical system that appropriately represents the quantity or concept (rep-
resentation).
3. Rules for applying the metrical system to tokens to produce the measurement re-
sults (procedures).
The reasons we undertake a measurement project —what we want to use the measure-
ment results for— may affect one or more of these steps. Although I list them separately, 
what happens in each stage should influence each other stage. We may, for example, come 
to re-characterise a category on the basis of results derived relative to a candidate metrical 
15 For discussion and references, see Cartwright et al. (1996). 
 Nancy Cartwright
280 Theoria, 2020, 35/3, 269-323
representation of it. Or we may pick a metric system because the procedural rules for apply-
ing it are well-defined, or users know these methods better, or they are easier to implement. 
In the end the three components must fit coherently together. That’s what ‘representation 
theorems’ are for: they are to show that the metrical system is appropriate to the concept 
as characterised and that the procedures can give accurate information about the concept 
characterized and in the form the representation demands.
Consider now precisification in the context of this theory of measurement. That the 
original Ballung concept has proven useful in many ways, the same may not be true for 
the more precise concept relative both to the way the world is and to what our purposes 
for it are. It may for instance lump together items that behave differently in ways we are 
concerned with or it may separate items that behave the same. Or it may lend itself to dis-
torted understanding. For instance, yes-no poverty measures, as opposed to ‘depth of pov-
erty measures’ have been criticised for incentivising governments to bring the richest of the 
poor just above the poverty line, ignoring the plight of those much worse off. This makes 
their poverty figures look better but it does not give an accurate picture of the amount of 
poverty people are experiencing and the amount of concomitant suffering.
Returning to the case at hand, let’s look at some samples of how democratic peace the-
orising measures democracy.
Characterisation
How we define a democracy often depends on what functional emphasis is placed on a 
political system. Democratic theorists who focus on institutional or procedural structure 
are apt to define democracy in terms of various rights and freedoms or structural relations 
about how the government works, as in for example Robert Dahl (1971, p. 128):
 i. The right to vote.
 ii. The right to be elected.
 iii. The right of political leaders to compete for support and votes.
 iv. Free and fair elections.
 v. Freedom of association.
 vi. Freedom of expression.
 vii. Alternative sources of information.
 viii. Institutions that depend on votes and other expressions of preference.
A government is, or is not, a democracy depending on whether it meets these criteria.
Alternatively, the focus may be on outcomes so that the defining aspect of democracy 
is success at ensuring certain freedoms and standards to its people, rather than the system 
itself:
‘Democracy’ is one of the most used and contested concepts in social science. This theoreti-
cal diversity is amply reflected in the empirical realm. While definitions and operationalizations 
of democracy vary quite a bit, we can make a broad distinction between ‘minimal’ and ‘maxi-
mal’ definitions of democracy. The former focus on the importance of ‘means’, that is, proce-
dures such as fair elections, respect for human rights, and universal suffrage. In contrast, maximal 
definitions include not only democratic procedures but also ‘ends’, or outputs (such as economic 
equality and social services). (Baviskar and Malone, 2004, p. 4)
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Here is a selection of characterisations on offer. The point to note is how many and how 
varied — and these are only a very small sample.
— For modern states, democracy … is usually identified with a voting franchise for a sub-
stantial fraction of citizens, a government brought to power in contested elections, 
and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to an elected legislature, often 
with requirements for civil liberties such as free speech. (Russett, 1994, p. 14)
— I define a liberal democracy as a state that instantiates liberal ideas, one where lib-
eralism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions. 
(Owen, 1994, p. 89)
— If a political regime is categorized as democratic only if the identities of the leaders of 
its executive branch and the members of its national legislature are determined in elec-
tions in which at least two independent political parties participate, in which at least 
half the adult population are eligible to vote, and if the fairness of elections has been 
established by at least one peaceful transfer of power between opposing political par-
ties, then an examination of controversial cases reveals that the proposition that dem-
ocratic states never fight wars against each other is defensible. (Ray, 1993, p. 251)
— … government with the consent of the governed. This formula is indeterminate 
with respect to institutional forms, or the procedures by which consent is to be ex-
pressed. (Whelan, 1983, p. 14)
— Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organi-
zations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can par-
ticipate in the decision-making process. (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 141)
— Government by the people, where liberty, equality and fraternity are secured to the 
greatest possible degree and in which human capacities are developed to the utmost, 
by means including free and full discussion of common problems and interests. 
(Pennock, 1979, p. 7)
— A study of Greek city states classifies ‘as a democracy any city that had an estab-
lished assembly of the demos and in which a party purporting to represent the demos 
had some power’. (Russett, 1994, p. 46)
Representation
— The simplest kind of representation of ‘democracy’ is as a dichotomous variable: 
‘yes’ if a country is a democracy, no if it is not. We would expect this when a list of 
criteria is set which must all be met, as in Dahl above.
— Alternatively an n-point spectrum might be indicated according to how many of 
the criteria are met, or how well.
— There are a variety of other more complicated ordinal ranking scales, like those 
composed by Polity IV and Freedom House below.
— Cardinal index numbers are also used, as in Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy which 
is on a scale of 0 to 100. (See below for how this is operationalised.)
— Fuzzy set representations have also been proposed.
— In the Greek City State study, to reflect both the nature of the city states them-
selves and of the data consulted, a 4-valued variable was used: Clear Democracies; 
All Other Democracies; Unknown; Not Democracies. Clear Democracies are those 
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judged to have met both criteria in the last characterisation listed above. The ‘All 
Other’ category consists of ‘those that did not but for which some evidence of de-
mocracy exists.’ (Russett, 1994, p. 47). This category is further coded into i) ‘a dem-
ocratic faction was in power’, ii) ‘an assembly was called for some constitutional 
decision (such as to declare war or assert autonomy) but there is no evidence of a 
regular assembly’, iii) ‘they are called democratic without evidence by Thucydides 
or modern scholars’, iv) they ‘were called a democracy but without convincing ev-
idence or were colonies of democratic power, with some evidence of democratic 
practice’. (Russett, 1994, p. 47).
Procedures
Again, there are very very many of these, as we can see in Figure 3. I shall describe a small 
sample. We should note that the descriptions here are still fairly abstract, giving no idea 
about what is actually to be done on the ground to make the measurement, for example, to 
get answers to the questions in the Freedom House procedures. So there will be layers of 
work below this, with great numbers of choices to be made at each. Because of this layering, 
we should not try to draw any firm and clear boundary between what counts as representa-
tion and what counts as procedures in all cases.
— Freedom House16
• Measurements are made along two axes and split into a number of subcategories:
— Political Rights
• Electoral Process (3 questions),
• Political Pluralism and Participation (4),
• Functioning of Government (3)
— Civil Liberties
• Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions),
• Associational and Organizational Rights (3),
• Rule of Law (4),
• Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (3)
• Each question receives a score from 0 to 4, 0 being the least and 4 the most dem-
ocratic.
— These aggregate scores are then converted to a number out of 7 for each axis, 
with 1 being the most free and 7 being not free. The average of the two deter-
mines the country’s ‘Freedom Rating’, with (1.0-2.5) being Free, (3.0-5.0) be-
ing Partially Free, and (5.5-7.0) being Not Free.
16 Freedom House is a US-based 501 US-government funded non-governmental organization (NGO). 
Independent Auditors’ Report. Freedom House Inc. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/
default/files/FINAL_Basic_Financial_Statements_2016.pdf. Accessed 30 March 2019. Its methodol-
ogy is found here: https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018. Accessed 30 
March 2019.
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— Scores are assigned by a group of analysts (publicly listed on the Freedom 
House website) in tandem with academic advisors.
• Polity IV17
— Polity IV aims to study an aggregate of data from 1800-2017 of all independ-
ent states with more than 500,000 members.
— It uses a 21-point scale ranging from –10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (estab-
lished democracy), sometimes broken up into three sub-categories: Autocra-
cies (–10 to –6), Anocracies (–5 to +5) and Democracies (+6 to +10).
— The data only contain information on the central government and groups act-
ing within the scope of the society. Break-away groups and other separatists 
not governed by the central authority are not considered.
— ‘There is no “necessary condition” for characterizing a political system as dem-
ocratic, rather democracy is treated as a variable. For example, the scale dis-
criminates among Western parliamentary and presidential systems based on 
the extent of constraints on the chief executive. Charles de Gaulle as presi-
dent of the French Fifth Republic operated within slight to moderate political 
limitations. Thus the early years of the Fifth Republic have lower Democracy 
scores than the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, where con-
straints on the executive approach parity.’18
— Scores are determined through two variables: ‘Institutionalised Democracy’ 
(DEMOC) and ‘Institutionalist Autocracy’ (AUTOC). A series of weighted 
scores are given to a set of questions for each category including ‘Competitive-
ness of Executive Recruitment’, ‘Constraint on Chief Executive’, and ‘Reg-
ulation of Participation’ amongst others. Scores for AUTOC are subtracted 
from DEMOC to give the final score.
— Scores are given by a group of dedicated coders. Efforts are made for consist-
ent coding practices, including having multiple coders work on the same da-
ta-sets, and sustained work to clarify the language used to formulate the crite-
ria (what, for example, constitutes a ‘faction’ or a ‘transition’).
• Vanhanen’s (2017) Index of Democracy
— Relies more heavily on data rather than the scoring of questions by analysts.
— Uses two axes: ‘competition’ and ‘participation’.
— Competition is defined as the percentage of votes for small or independent 
parties, or seats held by small or independent parties in government. It is cal-
culated by subtracting the largest party’s percentage from 100.
— Participation is defined by the percentage of adult citizens who voted.
— The minimum threshold for a democracy is considered to be 30% competi-
tion, and 10% participation.
— Both axes are combined to give the country’s Index of Democracy.
17 Center for Systematic Peace. Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. Ac-
cessed 30 March 2019.
18 Center for Systematic Peace. Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2017.
pdf. Accessed 30 March 2019.
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And what procedures do you think were employed by Russett to categorise the Greek City 
states as he indicated?
Figure 3
Abdel-Fattah Mady (2014). Democracy Barometer. Dr. Abdel-Fattah Mady’s Webpage. Retrieved from 
http://abdelfattahmady.net/index.php/research/research-interests-/453-democracy-barometer.html
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In conclusion
I have introduced the theory of measurement here for two reasons.
1. I hope that it has given you a feel for what kind of thing goes under the label 
‘middle-range theory’ and for the great variety of scientific activities that will be 
involved in any middle-range endeavour. Designing measures is a case of mid-
dle-range theorising par excellence. First off, we want concepts that will be both 
descriptively accurate and scientifically interesting, for instance by being linked 
in systematic ways with others or by being useful for prediction or manipulation. 
Then, how do we precisify them in a way that preserves both their scientific inter-
est and some modicum of their ability to describe what we wanted to describe in 
the first place?
 When it comes to the final product, it is essential that the three components of the 
measure mesh properly, so designing a measure is an iterative process. It is also es-
sential that we be able to show that they do so. In the best of cases we do that with 
a representation theorem that proves that the representation is appropriate to the 
concept as characterised and by providing a series of empirical postulates to show 
that the procedures can give correct information about that concept. This gener-
ally involves importing knowledge and assumptions from well beyond the domain 
in which the concept is originally embedded.
 What I hope you can see from this brief excursus into the vast work on measuring 
even just one concept in DPT is how much work —thick, detailed work— it takes, 
how complex it is and how intertwined the efforts must be, both internally within 
the measure itself and externally with work from other areas. This tangle of effort 
will play a big role in my final lecture.
2. I wanted to talk about middle-range theory in these lectures because I believe that 
middle-range theorising of all sorts is dramatically under-theorised in philosophy. 
Despite excellent recent work in history and philosophy of science and the earlier 
volumes by Duncan Luce and Patrick Suppes and associates, I think that this is 
still the case with respect even to this very central activity of designing and defend-
ing measures. So I offer here the framework developed by Bradburn, Fuller and me 
as a sample of the kind of work that philosophy can do on what goes on at the mid-
dle range.
Lecture 2. Causal-chain models and theories of change
Theories of change
This lecture provides a philosophical account of the ingredients required for good caus-
al-chain models and theories of change. Roughly, a causal-chain model lays out a series of 
significant steps, one after the other, by which a cause produces an effect. These models are 
often called ‘mechanisms’. To distinguish them from other senses of the term, I shall call 
them ‘causal-chain mechanisms’. The models I have in view are middle-range. They are the-
ories of the causal pathways from particular inputs to particular outputs afforded system-
atically by structural mechanisms. Figure 1 is a good example. It is a casual-loop diagram 
explaining how a programme of monitoring, checklists and targets undertaken to improve 
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child welfare had negative consequences. It is taken from the Munro Review of Child Pro-
tection mentioned in Lecture 1.
Figure 1
UK Department for Education (2011). Munro Review of Child Protection. Appendix.  
Retrieved from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/175391/Munro-Review.pdf
Theories of change, which are now widely demanded in policy contexts, are a subset of 
these middle-range causal-pathway models. Just as in Figure 1, in a theory of change the 
input is a policy or programme and the output is an outcome that the programme is sup-
posed to achieve. Theories of change are sometime called ‘theories of action’ or ‘logic mod-
els’. Here is one typical description: ‘When properly constructed, logic models... convey the 
underlying theory of action—how the program’s resources, activities, and outputs lead to 
desired outcomes.’19 Here is another, relevant to my running example of the democratic 
19 Wendy Kekahio, Brian Lawton, Louis Cicchinelli, and Paul Brandon. Logic models: A tool for effective 
program planning, collaboration, and monitoring. US Department of Education: IES, p. 3. Retrieved 
from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261177247_Logic_models_A_tool_for_effective_
program_planning_collaboration_and_monitoring
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peace: ‘A causal logic is a statement about how an independent variable exerts a causal ef-
fect on a dependent variable. It elaborates a specific chain of causal mechanisms that con-
nects these variables and takes the following form: A (the independent variable) causes B 
(the dependent variable) because A causes x, which causes y, which causes B ... In the case 
at hand, democratic peace theorists maintain that democracy has various effects, such as 
support for peaceful norms of conflict resolution, which, in turn, increase the prospect for 
peace’ (Rosato, 2003, p. 585).
You can see a catalogue of theories of change for the democratic peace in Rosato (2003 
p. 586). One scholar’s specific model is reproduced in Figure 2. For an example from a dif-
ferent domain, Figure 3 is the theory of change for the educational programme Read 180 
that I mentioned in Lecture 1.
Figure 2
Owen (1994, p. 102)
This kind of step-by step theory —with variables connected by arrows, ‘A causes x, which 
causes y, which causes B’— is supposed to be helpful in deciding what programme to adopt, 
in figuring out how to implement it and in evaluating after the fact whether it did the job. 
This is true to some extent. You may look at the theory and realise that some of the req-
uisite intermediaries will never be possible in your setting. And if you do decide to try 
the programme, knowing what is supposed to happen when allows you to monitor that 
the programme is on track. You can also use the information for post hoc evaluation. Sup-
pose the targeted outcome occurs. Observing that each of the requite intermediate steps 
obtained, and did so just when it was supposed to, provides strong evidence that the pro-
gramme was responsible.
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Figure 3
U.S. Department of Defense Education Activity. READ 180 Research Protocol and Tools.  
Introduction, p. 3.  
Retrieved from https://www.scholastic.com/dodea/read180_administrators.htm
Three problems
There are three major hurdles to the effective use of theories like these. All three are raised 
among practitioners themselves and all three are rooted in solid philosophical work on cau-
sality. The first is highlighted in JL Mackie’s INUS account. The second, which I shall ar-
gue is underwritten by a descendent of Wesley Salmon’s (1984) process/interaction theory 
of causality, is a complaint we can find in literatures on process tracing and in what is called 
‘realist evaluation’. The third is the central objection of realist evaluation to step-by step 
theories of change. It depends on the same philosophic argument made in Lecture 1, that 
what will cause what depends on the underlying structural mechanism (which realist evalu-
ation calls ‘context’, reserving ‘mechanism’ for something else).
Problem 1. No matter how full the programme design for policy interventions like 
Read 180 or deworming is, the policy intervention is seldom enough on its own to produce 
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the targeted effect. Policy programmes need what Jeremy Hardie and I call ‘support factors’ 
(Cartwright and Hardie, 2012) if they are to work. A theory of change that leaves out what 
support factors must obtain, or be put in place, to operate with the policy programme to 
produce the effect is seriously incomplete.
Problem 2. Policy and programme evaluation is a big industry: did this policy do what 
it was supposed to when implemented? will it work here? where will it work? Realist evalu-
ation is one school of how to go about it. Realist evaluators are realist about the causal pro-
cesses and activities by which policies produce their outcomes. They side with ‘mechanist’ 
social theorists in complaining that theories of change like those in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 ig-
nore activities (the ‘mechanisms’ by which effects are produced) and picture only variables 
at the nodes, with thin arrows in between.
For instance, from Peter Hedström, who helped found the field of analytic sociology, 
and economic sociologist Richard Swedberg in their introduction to Social Mechanisms: ‘…
the increasing use of [survey analysis and statistical techniques] has … fostered the develop-
ment of a variable centered type of theorizing that only pays scant attention to explanatory 
mechanisms’; and from leading expert on realist evaluation Ray, Pawson (2000, p.  301-
303): ‘..in most survey and evaluation research, theory is ‘flattened’ so that it is expressi-
ble only in X à Y propositions … Theory is indeed flattened so that middle-range questions 
about contexts, mechanisms are squeezed from the agenda’.
Theory is flattened in two ways. One of the things that is wrong with these ‘varia-
ble-and-arrow’ theories is that they have nothing to say about the underlying structure that 
affords these causal processes, which is the core of my third problem. The other is that they 
do not show what the cause at each step does to produce the effect at the next step. They 
represent the effects achieved by a cause but not the activities that the cause engages in in 
order to produce those effects. This makes for troubles in at least two ways.
a) The first relates to support factors. If we do not know how the cause is to produce its 
effect, we will have a hard time figuring out what the requisite support factors are. Ray 
Pawson and Nick Tilley (1997) give an extended example of the reduction in car thefts 
by installing CCTV cameras in car parks. Do the cameras scare the thieves off from 
fear of being recognised? Or do they allow the police to arrest the thieves by dashing to 
the car park as soon as they see suspicious activity? Or in one or more of a dozen other 
ways they suggest. If it is the first, then one of the support factors is that the cameras be 
clearly visible to prospective thieves. If it is the second, that they are well hidden.
b) Knowing what the cause does is almost essential for identifying those contexts in 
which it can do it, i.e. to identifying the structural mechanism that affords that 
causal pathway. For instance, as we shall see in more detail below, many explana-
tions for the democratic peace suppose democracies do not go to war with other 
democracies because liberal ideas (whether in the populace as a whole or among 
liberal elites) on both sides take liberal ‘norms’ in other states as indicators of the 
legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of force against them. Does this means that ‘de-
mocracy’ as characterized in either of the two ways below is not a good enough 
marker to pick out contexts in which serious tensions will be resolved short of war?
• For modern states, democracy … is usually identified with a voting franchise for 
a substantial fraction of citizens, a government brought to power in contested 
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elections, and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to an elected 
legislature, often with requirements for civil liberties such as free speech. (Rus-
sett, 1994, p. 1)
• Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing leaders and 
organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the 
public can participate in the decision-making process. (Schattschneider, 
1960, p. 141)
 Do we need instead ‘liberal’ democracy, as for instance with John M Owens: ‘I 
define a liberal democracy as a state that instantiates liberal ideas, one where lib-
eralism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions.’ 
(Owen, 1994, p. 89). With this definition, Owen argues, the marker does not 
catch in its net the US-British War of 1812, which has troubled scholars as a possi-
ble counterexample to the democratic peace, since ‘the War of 1812 was fought at 
a time when almost no Americans considered England a democracy.’ Owen (1994, 
p. 90).
Problem 3. This is the one from Lecture 1. Different causal pathways are possible in differ-
ent contexts. That was the point about pressing the lever on the toaster versus on the toi-
let. So a causal-chain model will hold some places and not others. But there’s nothing in the 
boxes and arrows to indicate that.
Problems and theories of causality that back them up
These are serious complaints that do not just follow from local arguments and examples in 
practice communities. Each of the three is backed by a serious philosophic theory of cau-
sality. Together the three corresponding theories of causality have real sting because they 
are mutually consistent and together they provide a rich account of how the causality rep-
resented in theories of change is supposed to work. Just what do I mean by ‘backing’ here? 
Here is an answer that Haggeo Cadenas offered in commenting on this lecture:20
First, one should note that when X backs up Y, X lends a sort of support to Y. If a strong 
muscular person is backing me up, then whoever is against me, risks facing the strong person. 
Similarly, if the theories are backing up the problems… whoever believes the problems are negligi-
ble pays the price of rejecting the philosophical theory. For example, a causal chain theorist who 
does not feel the need to include support factors risks paying the intellectual price of rejecting 
Mackie’s very intuitive INUS account […].
… [Second], the theories also play a prescriptive role. This role is captured by [Figure  4]. 
How do they give such prescriptions? I think it is that the three philosophical theories are gen-
eral theories of how causation occurs and hence how it should be represented: As Cartwright 
says: “… [the theories] provide a rich account of how the causality represented in theories of 
change is supposed to work”. Mackie says it occurs with support factors. Salmon says causes 
occur via processes and interactions. The realists claim that causes occur because of structural 
mechanisms and contextual features. The reason these theories of causation relate to theories of 
change (a sub-class of causal-chain models) is that changes occur because of causation… [T]heo-
20 Haggeo Cadenas (‘Cartwright on Good Causal Chain Models’. Dept. of Philosophy, UCSD, March 
2019).
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ries of change, then, are subject to theories of causation because the latter are philosophical ac-
counts of the former…
[So] the three philosophical theories back up the three problems in two distinct ways. First, 
the philosophical theories place an intellectual price tag for whoever wishes to deny that the prob-
lems are genuine problems. Thus, one type of backing the theories do is motivational. Secondly, 
the philosophical theories, by being an account of causation/change, provide a general framework 
for how theories of change should be formulated. Thus, they back up the problems by playing a 
prescriptive role: one should formulate theories of change in such a way that avoid the three prob-
lems.
Figure 4
By Haggeo Cadenas
I’ll describe each of these three theories, developing them in a way that I hope makes clear 
their use in understanding theories of change and the phenomena these theories are sup-
posed to represent. Since I introduced structural mechanisms yesterday, I can keep that dis-
cussion very short, so I will start there. Next I’ll turn to support factors, where I believe the 
philosophic theory will be familiar. Last I will turn to processes and activities, which will 
take the bulk of my effort.
Theory 1: Structural mechanisms/ context
What causal pathways are possible depends on the underlying structure. As Michael 
 Strevens (2012) points out, sometimes it is left implicit what this structure is though the 
intended referent is recognised in the community of practice. Often it is picked out by 
markers, as I have illustrated with the democratic peace. In cases where we are especially 
well informed, a description of the relevant features of the structure can be supplied. But 
when a causal-chain model is offered for use, the mechanisms that afford it must be indi-
cated in some way or another.
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Theory 2: Support factors
Let us label the effects represented at each stage in the theory of change by Xi, as in Figure 5.
X1 → X2 → ... → Xn
Xnc ≡ An1Yn1v ... v AnmYnm
Figure 5
JL Mackie (1965) taught that generally causes are INUS conditions for their effects: Insuf-
ficient but Necessary parts of Unnecessary but Sufficient conditions. It is usual to represent 
this thus, as in Figure 5:
Mackie formula: Xn c ≡ An1Xn1 v … v AnmXnm
Here Xn is the effect at stage n and the ‘c’ in front of the equivalence sign is to signify that 
the features referred to on the right-hand side are its causes and not mere correlates.21 The 
Xs are distinguished from the As in this version of the formula in that the Xs are meant to 
represent causes of interest. The As are then thought of as the ‘support factors’ that must 
also be in place if that cause is to contribute to the production of the effect. In general A is 
to be filled in by a conjunction of a large number of factors.
This familiar Mackie formula is for cases involving dichotomous (yes/no) variables. 
For multivalued variables the analogue looks like this:
Generalised Mackie formula: xn = ∑1manixni
In epidemiology it is common to represent a set of factors represented in a single term of a 
Mackie equation —factors that together are sufficient for a contribution to the outcome— 
as slices in a ‘causal pie’, as in Figure 6.
Figure 6
21 So this is not a theory of what causality IS but rather about the form of causal relations. In Mackie’s ac-
count the causality is constituted by a kind of fixity.
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Although there may be many possible causal pathways that lead to the same effect, repre-
sented in the separate terms in the Mackie formula, the theory of change for a programme 
only describes the one generated by the programme. So at each step the other ways in 
which the outcome can be produced are ignored. This omission seems appropriate given 
that the job is to provide a theory of how the programme is to achieve the outcome, not a 
theory of everything that can contribute to that outcome.
More worrying is the omission of the support factors needed at each stage to produce 
the next. These are essential if the outcome is to be produced, so it seems that the theory 
cannot be of much use for planning or monitoring if it leaves these out.
To remind ourselves about the omission of these support factors, I recommend a no-
tation like Figure 7, which replaces the nodes on the path with wedges to signify that we 
are representing at each stage only one element of the causal pie that it takes to produce 
the next — an element that the stage before played a role in producing. A more satisfactory 
theory of change would fill these in, as Figure 8 suggests.
Figure 7
Figure 8
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Theory 3: Activities and the process/interaction theory
The claim that causality is not just one inert event after another but, rather, causes are ac-
tive in producing their effects is familiar in philosophy. The philosophic theory of causality 
that I think fits best with the ‘realist’ and process-tracing practice recommendations I men-
tioned is one I build from Wesley Salmon’s ‘at-at’ process/interaction theory.
Salmon’s theory is an attempt to rescue the notion of causation from the damaging at-
tack of Bertrand Russell. Russell was concerned with orderly recurring sequences of events 
like those described by the laws of physics: for instance, the elliptical orbiting of the plan-
ets around the sun, described by Kepler’s laws and derivable from Newton’s. However one 
wants to think about the relation between these laws and the sequence they describe —per-
haps the sequences just happen to keep happening in the same orderly way and the laws 
just describe that, as in a Humean view, or our scientific laws represent laws of nature that 
somehow govern these happenings— Russell argued that there are special problems with 
the idea that one event in the sequence causes another later to happen. The problem is tim-
ing. The cause is gone before the effect occurs. How can it then do anything, let alone bring 
a whole new effect into existence?
Salmon’s account has two key ingredients: causal processes (which include enduring 
objects and systems, like particles and social institutions) and causal interactions. When 
an event at one time and place is supposed to cause an event somewhere else later, the at-at 
theory pictures the first event as a causal interaction of two (or more) causal processes that 
either initiates a new process or produces a change in one of them. The affected process is 
then located at every point between the cause event and the effect event. Some time be-
fore the effect, the causing process intersects or overlaps with the affected process and caus-
ally interacts with it: the first does something to the second.22 The effect process is thereby 
changed in such a way that it now, at the right time and place, possesses the characterising 
features of the effect event.
The theory is called the ‘at-at’ theory following Russell’s own solution to Zeno’s par-
adoxes of motion, adapted to the space-time relations between cause and effect. There is a 
gap between the events we call cause and effect but there is no puzzle about how the cause, 
which no longer exists in that gap, can produce the effect at the end of the gap. The cause 
event is an interaction (either instantaneous or stretching over a duration) of spatially and 
temporally extended continuous processes. The interaction changes one of them or initi-
ates a new process. The initial cause is not a cause of some next event in the process. The 
changed process simply exists with the relevant changes (or as I will note, the naturally 
evolved versions of them) at every point up to and throughout the next interaction.23
Although Salmon tried hard to use as few causal concepts in his theory as possible, it is 
clearly not a reductive theory, nor did he claim it to be. The account is riddled with causal 
discourse, especially as I have laid it out. Salmon himself stressed the importance of distin-
guishing causal processes, like a beam of light from a rotating beacon, from non-causal ones, 
22 Perhaps the second also does something to the first.
23 In commenting on this lecture, Ahmed Siddiqi asks ‘how does the process just exist at every point?’ 
(Personal correspondence. UCSD, 15 February 2019). The answer from the point of view of both 
Russell and Salmon is that it just does. That is what happens naturally in the empirical world. See also 
my discussion below about ‘natural evolution’.
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like the moving spot on a stadium wall created by that beam. Only interactions with gen-
uine causal processes can cause later effects: inserting a red filter someplace on the wall to 
turn the light spot there red cannot cause later effects in the moving spot on the wall.
To diminish the causal concepts employed in the analysis, Phil Dowe (2000) devel-
oped a special ‘energy conservation/exchange’ form of the process/interaction theory in 
which the interactions are exchanges of energy between energetic processes. Then the en-
ergy, being conserved, exists at every point in the process until the next exchange. The en-
ergy in the light beam is conserved from point to point: the beam can figure in causal inter-
actions. The energy is then absorbed in the wall, appearing in some micro processes there. 
It does not appear in any successor spots on the wall: the ‘moving spot’ is not a process that 
can participate in causal interactions.
The hope here was that causal processes could be replaced by processes in which the 
energy is the same at each place and time and causal interactions could be replaced by re-
duction of energy in one process and increase of energy by the same amount in another at 
the same space-time point. I can’t see how this can work. It seems possible for the energy 
in one process —process A— to transfer to a second —process B—, thereby diminishing 
by some amount, say ϕ, the energy in A, at the same time and place as the energy in process 
C is increased by that same amount ϕ from interaction with process D. The energy has not 
been exchanged between A and C so events in A cannot cause ones in C but the account 
seems to judge that it does so.
Whether this worry can be handled in the energy-conservation version of Salmon’s 
process/interaction theory does not really matter for our purposes though. For it certainly 
doesn’t help with causation in social settings. Still, I think the original Salmon ideas can 
help in the social sciences, so long as we do not try to use them to produce a reductive ac-
count of causation, which I at any rate have long argued is impossible. I want rather to use 
these ideas to develop an account not about what causality is but about what it is like, an 
account that makes sense of the ‘realist’ and process-tracing practice recommendations I 
mentioned. This involves developing Salmon’s theory to make it more responsive to social 
science settings, which were not the kind of cases Salmon had chiefly in view. This in turn 
requires inter alia keeping firmly in view not only the processes involved but the settings 
in which they are to occur, which for our purposes are the settings to which the theory of 
change is supposed to apply —the structural mechanisms that afford them.
For these purposes I should note that although Salmon worked to distinguish causal 
from non-causal processes, he did not attempt to give identity conditions for processes, 
nor did he grapple with the issue of the natural development of a given process. The first of 
these —just what a process is— is an important question that is the subject of much serious 
work in metaphysics right now. I defer to this in order to discuss issues of more immediate 
concern for understanding theories of change. What matters for our purposes is that, what-
ever the metaphysics of processes is, a process should be able to sustain the features needed 
for the process/interaction theory.
The second issue requires more comment for our purposes. A process exhibits an array 
of features at different times. Which features obtain when and where are characteristic of 
the kind of process it is in the setting in which it occurs. For example, a golf ball hit off a tee 
in a St Andrews’ golf course is a causal process, one that lends itself to the Dowe-style story. 
It changes its position over time, flying through the air and eventually striking the earth 
with a thud, crushing the grass beneath it.
 Nancy Cartwright
296 Theoria, 2020, 35/3, 269-323
This process/interaction story supports a typical philosophical example of a singular 
causal claim, geared to mesh with the ‘energy conservation’ version of the process/inter-
action theory: the launching of the ball in just that way at the tee caused the crushed grass 
in the St Andrews’ course (or, thinking of a causal prediction, ‘will cause the grass to be 
crushed there’). We may suppose, idealising, that apart from a minor effect of the drag of 
the air, the ball retains the energy imparted to it by the swing of the club.
What I have just described is the natural evolution of that process in that setting. The 
interaction of the ball with the golf club initiates the process, ‘the flight of the ball’. What 
is important about this flight-of-the-ball process vis-à-vis our causal claim is that it has fea-
tures during the period of interaction with the grass that allow the ball to crush the grass. 
I’ve tried to design the case so that the feature of the flight-of-the-ball process that matters 
for the crushing is the energy, which as it happens has been the same throughput the pro-
cess. But what makes our causal claim true on my more general version of the Salmon pro-
cess/interaction theory is not that the features that matter have to do with energy nor that 
they are the same across the history of the process. Rather, it is that they are features that
a) in combination with the features of the grass allow for the interaction of the ball 
and grass to crush the grass
b) are features of the process that the interaction of the swing with the golf ball initi-
ated and
c) are features that the interaction with the swing introduced into that process.
There are several things to note.
1. There are no counterfactuals involved. Salmon did not like counterfactuals and was 
at pains to avoid them. On his theory, it is irrelevant whether, had the swing not initiated 
just that flight-of-the-ball process, some other process would have interacted with the grass 
to crush it. The concern is with what actually caused what, in situ; with what did the job —
not what might have done the job if the current cause had not been on duty. This is one of 
the features that make the Salmon process/interaction theory suitable for understanding 
the causal accounts given by evaluators and causal-process tracers. Consider: it may be fool-
ish to hire me to accomplish a result that will happen in some other way if you don’t hire 
me. But this does not excuse you from paying me if, on post hoc evaluation, it is clear that I 
did what I was supposed to, that what I did is what in point of fact produced the outcome.
2. The ball interacts with the air during the whole course of the process. This is defi-
nitely a fact about this process in this setting —the process that (we are supposing) actually 
happened (or will happen) at St Andrews’ course. The interactions with the air are irrele-
vant to the truth of our causal claim about what happened (or will happen) because they do 
not rob the process of the features it must have to interact with the grass. But other interac-
tions along the way might matter. Generally, interactions that occur between the cause event 
and the effect event that change the evolving characteristics of the causing process can affect 
that process in different ways, which in turn affects the truth of the causal claim in differ-
ent ways. If they remove features necessary for the final effect, the original causal claim will 
be false. In the opposite direction, they can enhance the process in two different ways. They 
can add features that by themselves are what actually bring about the effect without resort to 
those possessed before these interactions occur. Then the original interaction will not have 
causal responsibility for the effect. Or, recalling the facts about INUS causality, they can add 
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support factors —factors that cannot by themselves produce the effect but work with factors 
already in the process to do so. In that case they share causal responsibility.
3. Causation is always via causal interaction: no interaction, no causation. Between in-
teractions, whatever is happening is not causal. So earlier events in a process do not cause 
later ones. In the simplest cases, like the idealised golf ball, where the features created at the 
initial interaction are the same ones that are essential for producing the effect during the 
later interaction, the features ‘get’ from the earlier interaction to the later by being at every 
point in between. That’s the point of Salmon’s at-at theory. For more complicated —more 
realistic— cases, features essential for producing the effect in the later interaction evolve 
from those produced at the earlier one. In those cases it is features that have evolved from 
ones produced at the start and that will evolve into ones essential for producing the effect 
later that are at the appropriate places at the appropriate times. For this to make sense, of 
course, we need to accept that there are natural processes of evolution for some features, 
described perhaps by natural laws, and that these are not processes in which earlier states 
cause the ones that evolve later. This is just what this feature does over time, much as we 
suppose that a body in motion tends to remain in motion —that is its natural evolution 
with no causal interactions necessary to get from earlier to later states.
Although causality is missing, there is no suggestion that it is arbitrary what features 
are where when. The evolving pattern of kinetic and potential energy in the golf ball in its 
specific setting in St Andrews is in accord with ‘natural law’. In the social science cases, the 
same is true for whatever is the appropriate analogue of natural law there. This should be 
true for any account of laws and principles in the natural and social sciences so long as the 
account does not suppose laws must have to do with causation. On the process/interaction 
account, causation —one thing making another happen— is something over and above 
things happening as scientific laws describe.
4. For Salmon, the cause is always an interaction or an event that marks an interac-
tion, just as the effect is. But there does not seem to be any loss in weakening that require-
ment. On the at-at story as I have told it, there are features at every point in the process 
from initial interaction that evolve ‘naturally’ into those that are essential for the produc-
tion of the effect in a subsequent interaction. I propose to count the appearance of features 
at the appropriate time and place that will evolve into ones essential to the ultimate pro-
duction of the effect as causes as well.
5. Thin causal ascriptions should give way to thick ones.24 Processes don’t just interact; 
they do things to each other, specific things. The CCTV camera does not just cause pro-
spective thieves to go away; it scares them off or motivates them to try elsewhere. The golf 
ball thudding to the ground does not just cause the grass to lie flat; it crushes the grass.
Is there something to be said about what makes thick causal interactions causal? I 
think not, nothing very informative, and certainly nothing involving less ‘causally loaded’ 
language. The one process changes the other, and it does so in such a way that produces the 
features that designate the effect.
24 For a nice discussion of the ‘causatives’ that express these thick concepts in natural language and their 
surrounding philosophic advantages, see Julian Reiss, ‘Cause, causatives and theories of causation’. Re-
trieved from http://www.jreiss.org/Presentations/HK_Cause%2C%20Causatives%2C%20Causa-
tion.pdf
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Nor do I understand why we should want more. Hume enjoined us to look for something 
more because he couldn’t find these causal processes nor their thick interactions in his highly 
filtered world view. If we have them in ours, what need is there for some further characteris-
ing features that fairly unambiguously sort interactions into two bins, causal versus non-causal? 
I may want to know that the CCTV camera did its job. I hired it to prevent car crime and car 
crime diminished. Did the cameras earn their pay or was this just a lucky outcome for them? If 
they convince me that they scared prospective thieves away, that’s all I need to know. I don’t 
need further assurance that ‘scaring away’ in this case is an instance of ‘causing’.
I say this despite the fact that I have spent decades studying causal inference and meth-
odologies for establishing causal claims. But what we are doing in establishing a causal 
claim, I take it, is establishing that there is a thick relation (or a set of relations) holding be-
tween the putative cause and effect that has certain features of interest in the case at hand 
—for instance, raising the probability of the effect once other ‘causes’ have been held fixed, 
which is what the probabilistic theory of causality finds interesting.
6. When the golf ball thuds to the ground, it is no accident that the result is some 
sorry looking grass. A heavy object thudding onto a fragile one is just the kind of thing that 
results in the fragile object being crushed. Although this may not be among the laws of our 
fundamental physics, this a familiar fact of nature, it is the way the world works. This mat-
ters when we are in the business of laying out a theory of change. We need reassurance that 
we can rely on the activities that are supposed to produce the targeted effects: they do so in 
accord with the way nature operates, albeit not as described in our most fundamental and 
general laws. As Jon Elster argues ‘Specifying a causal chain does not mean giving up on 
general laws altogether, only going from general laws at a high level of abstraction to laws at 
a lower level of abstraction.’ (Elster, 2015, p. 25). Much of the third lecture will be devoted 
to these lower or middle-range laws. For now I just want to insist that a good process/in-
teraction theory should employ them. These are essential for showing that the activities we 
cite in our causal models can do what we say they do.
7. James Woodward has pointed out that ‘the philosophy of science and structural 
equation literature has focused almost exclusively on type-level causal claims… By contrast, 
philosophers working in the tradition inaugurated by David Lewis have focused exclusively 
on token causation’. (Woodward, 2005, p.74). I take the process/interaction theory as I 
have expanded it here to be appropriate to both.
SO: I propose that a process/interaction model be adopted as a general framework for 
theories of change, on which ideally a theory of change will involve four essential ingredients:
1. The ‘natural’ (non-causal) evolution of factors from the place and time of the 
cause to that of the effect
2. The nature of the interaction by which the effect is produced — the ‘activity’
3. The principles —often middle-range— which the interaction instances
4. An account of, or at least a marker for, the kind of underlying structures that af-
ford the sequence of changes theorised
This accords well with what Derek Beach and R B Pederson (2019, p. 30) describe in their 
text on process-tracing:
…a causal mechanism can … be portrayed as
X → [(n1 →) * (n2 →)] Y
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This should be read as X transmits causal forces through the mechanism composed of part 1 
(entity 1 and an activity) and part 2 (entity 2 and an activity) that together contribute to produc-
ing outcome Y. This is a “context free” mechanism [NC: i.e. free of mention of the underlying 
structure that affords the surface-level causal mechanism pictured], and a proper study would also 
detail the contextual conditions that enable the [NC: surface-level] mechanism to be activated.
Deploying the three philosophic accounts
With these three philosophical theories as tools, let us now consider how we can handle the 
three objections raised to theories of change like those represented in Figures 1-4. The first 
caution to note is that whether an objection is apt depends on the purpose for which the 
theory is intended. I have been looking at the different purposes to which such figures are 
commonly put: post hoc evaluation, ex ante prediction and middle-range theorising. Since 
our topic here is middle-range theory, I will focus on that. In this case the aim is to present 
an account that holds widely and reliably across some domain that is picked out either im-
plicitly or explicitly, an account that is reasonable to take as default-correct failing reasons 
to the contrary (though, as always, with due attention to the chance of failure). How do the 
problems fare in view of the three philosophic theories about causality I have adumbrated?
Context. Theory 1 claims that whether the causal pathways pictured in the mid-
dle-range theory of change will obtain depends on the underlying structural mechanism. 
Without specifying what this is, the theory of change is dramatically under specified. We 
need to know where it will hold widely reliably since it certainly won’t hold many places.
This information can be added as, for example, suggested at the bottom of Figure 3, 
but with two cautions.
— The description of the context actually has to be added, whereas in Figure 3 all that 
is done is to take note of the fact that context matters. In fortuitous cases, a com-
plicated account of the structure that affords the pathways represented will not be 
necessary —the job can be done with markers. This, though, invites another stage of 
middle-range theorising, as I stressed in Lecture 1, to make credible that the mark-
ers are indeed reliable.
— Beware the arrows from the bottom level upwards. The horizontal arrows in these 
kinds of representations are standardly taken to mean that the feature at the head of 
the arrow causes the feature at the tip.25 It is a matter of some discussion what these 
arrows could sensibly mean. Carl Craver (2007), for example, maintains that the it-
erations of the structural mechanism constitute the surface causal behaviour. John 
Pemberton, Sarah Wieten and I (Cartwright et  al., 2018), by contrast, argue that 
the features of the parts of the structural mechanism are governed by general prin-
ciples, often familiar ones, and the surface behaviour just is what it is for the parts 
to obey those principles in the particular arrangement found in that mechanism. 
Whatever other account we might endorse we surely should not suppose that the 
operation of the structural mechanism causes the causal relations pictured in the fig-
25 Of course it is the features represented at the head and tail that are supposed to be causally related. For 
simplicity of presentation I will not be careful about use/mention distinctions like this except in cases 
where it might be confusing to conflate the two.
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ures. So we need some different understanding of them or other. I am going to go 
with the Cartwright/Pemberton/Wieten account because it makes place for prin-
ciples, which play an essential role in ensuring that results of the activity in the ef-
fect-producing interaction are not happenstance.
Support factors
When the aim of the figure is to present a middle-range theoretical claim, I think my own ob-
jection here will often be misplaced even though it is based in the Mackie theory of INUS 
causality that I endorse. That’s because we expect the figure to be relatively uncluttered and 
the level of specificity to be uniform across it. But generally, at the level at which the figured 
cause is described, there are often a great many configurations of support factors that can 
work with it to produce the effect. We philosophers may be prone to miss this since our usual 
example is that of striking a match to produce a flame, with the support factor of oxygen in 
mind. There’s not much you can substitute for oxygen if you want to start a fire. But there 
often is in social settings. Homework will not produce increased learning without a number 
of support factors, but some are intersubstitutable. For instance, if pupils do not have a quiet 
supportive place to work at home, an afterschool homework club may do as well.
Of course one can always deal with this by moving up in abstraction. But often there’s 
no informative description to give beyond, ‘add the right thing at the right time,’ which 
should go without saying. Alternatively, one can fill in some particular set, or sets, of sup-
port factors at the right level of specificity. But this can be misleading —suggesting that 
there is good theoretical reason for supposing these particular features are necessary, as with 
the oxygen— and can also correlatively curtail imagination about what might do as well.
This argues for regularising a convention with respect to these kinds of theoretical rep-
resentations —a convention that I suspect is actually already often in place, though practi-
tioners may not articulate it. I propose then that a good rule to adopt for this kind of mid-
dle-range theorising is that
— it should be understood that the cause depicted requires support factors if the effect 
is to be achieved
— in settings where it is to be applied, either one or more sets of sufficient support fac-
tors should obtain or be reasonably easy to put in place
— specific support factors are represented if, but only if, they are necessary widely 
across cases (like oxygen for the flame)
— in any particular setting, for either post hoc evaluation or ex ante prediction, more 
detailed information with full sets of support factors needs to be provided.
What does the cause do?
What shall we do about the objection that the answer to this question is not generally at 
all apparent in theories of change? A combination of my reconstructed Salmon process/
interaction account with the account of the role of general principles in the operation of 
structural mechanisms provides an answer. Begin with the process/interactions theory, es-
pecially with the requirement that if C at t is to cause E at t’ later in a particular kind of 
setting, first, C must comprise features whose natural evolution in that kind of setting are 
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essential in the interaction at t’ to the production of E there, and second, those evolved fea-
tures must do something in that interaction to produce E. This is not just a philosopher’s 
demand. It is one that practitioners care about, and with good reason, because it can have 
real practical implications.
The same is true with the democratic peace theory. Since these are philosophy lectures, 
it is natural to start with Kant. In very brief: Kant believed that rational citizens will be 
against wars since they are both personally dangerous and economically costly. Thus, a gov-
ernment dictated by the will of rational citizens will be reticent to engage in conflict:
Now, in point of fact, the Republican Constitution, in addition to the purity of its origin as 
arising from the original source of the conception of Right, includes also the prospect of realiz-
ing the desired object: Perpetual Peace among the nations. And the reason of this may be stated 
as follows. According to the Republican Constitution, the consent of the citizens as members of 
the State is required to determine at any time the question, ‘Whether there shall be war or not?’ 
Hence, nothing is more natural than that they should be very loath to enter upon so undesirable 
an undertaking; for in decreeing it, they would necessarily be resolving to bring upon themselves 
all the horrors of War. And, in their case, this implies such consequences as these: to have to fight 
in their own persons; to supply the costs of the war out of their own property; to have sorrow-
fully to repair the devastation which it leaves behind; and, as a crowning evil, to have to take upon 
themselves at the end a burden of debt which will go on embittering peace itself, and which it will 
be impossible ever to pay off on account of the constant threatening of further impending wars. 
On the other hand, in a Constitution where the Subject is not a voting member of the State, and 
which is, therefore, not Republican, the resolution to go to war is a matter of the smallest concern 
in the world. (Kant, 1795)
Casting the basic ideas of this explanation into the process/interaction framework, ‘de-
mocracies’ can be re-described as states that do the will of rational agents. Such states choose 
peaceful resolution in times of conflict. In terms of our contemporary rational choice the-
ory, given that the state will do the will of the rational agents that make it up, we can see this 
course of action as falling in one fell swoop under the two general principles ‘Rational agents 
choose the action that maximises their expected utility’ and ‘The disutility of the danger and 
cost of war is (almost) always greater than the disutility from peaceful alternatives’.
‘Choose’ may seem a very thin causative that does not go far towards underwriting the 
demand for the description of the activity by which the effect is produced, perhaps hardly 
thicker than ‘cause’ itself when the casual agents are reasoning conscious people and their 
governments. But in this context I think not. In contemporary social science using the 
term ‘rational’ invites a placement in rational choice theory, where ‘choice’ is a highly con-
strained concept. We ‘choose’ among a set of pre-determined options about which we have 
‘preferences’, which must satisfy a number of conditions that are demanding enough to in-
troduce the concept of utility. ‘Choose’ also places the account on the normative side of the 
norm/structure divide I am about to describe.
A Kantian-style account is only one of a great many explanations of the democratic 
peace. DPT is thus a good testing ground for how well the process/interaction scheme I ad-
vocate serves as a model for middle-range theories of change. Here is another explanation, 
this one on the institutional as opposed to the normative side, again highly caricatured in 
order to make clear the basic form. The story is that when the two opposing states are de-
mocracies, voters in each see the other as powerful because democracies tend to be power-
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ful and to have powerful allies. Voters don’t like long wars and they definitely don’t like 
losing, so they don’t like wars with powerful opponents. In a democracy, leaders are respon-
sive to the likes and dislikes of voters for fear of losing office. So the leaders find some other 
resolution than war.
We can graph this in a step-by-step variables/arrows diagram like Figure 5. But the 
process/interaction requires us to add activities and principles. So: given that voters’ dis-
like losing and they believe that it will be hard to win against a powerful opponent, the vot-
ers choose to be opposed to war with this opponent (they are not, for example, coerced into 
this attitude). This outcome is not happenstance. It is an instance of the principle: ‘People 
who choose freely and rationally choose their preferred option among those allowed’, since, 
given that the political structure is a democracy, opposition to the war is allowed. The lead-
ers fear losing office; the voters’ opposition motivates them to hunt a peaceful resolution. 
That the attitude of the voters has this effect is not happenstance either. Their attitude can 
make a difference because of the general principle: ‘Leaders tend to do what it takes to stay 
in power’, and in a democracy doing what the voters like is what it takes.
Note that Figure 5 does not graph support factors. That’s because, as I noted, for the 
explanatory chain represented there, the support factors may differ from case to case, with 
nothing very informative in common across them. That, as I argued, is one of the reasons 
that the activities matter. Knowing what the activities are can help us to identify what the 
support factors might be in particular cases. For instance, if voters are to favour a peace-
ful resolution to the conflict with another democracy because they prefer not to fight long, 
costly wars, they will need to recognise that this opponent is a democracy and that democ-
racies tend to be powerful and have powerful allies. That can be aided by a lively free press 
and a culture in which the voters are politically engaged. Or by a strong and active Quaker 
movement that is quick to draw public attention to the dangers. Or by a variety of other lo-
cal arrangements. But just what those local arrangements are will be different for different 
explanations involving different activities.
In Conclusion
Theories of change are helpful for ex ante prediction, post hoc evaluation and mid-
dle-range theorising. But not in their usual form. To do the jobs they are employed for, 
they should be process/interaction theories of the kind I have developed here. Many thanks 
to Wesley Salmon for the start on this.
Lecture 3. Mechanisms and middle-range laws
Explanations and mechanisms
Although the maxim ‘Democracies do not go to war with democracies’ is widely accepted, 
as we have seen, there is no widespread agreement about its explanation. And explanations 
matter, as scholars engaged in DPT note:
— From Russet (1994): ‘[N]o merely empirical relationship can be compelling with-
out a powerful theoretical explanation’ (p. 30). Russet later explains that there are 
in the literature two chief ‘causal mechanisms of peace.’ (Russet, 1994, p. 84)
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— From Owen (1994): ‘That we do not really know the causal mechanism behind the 
democratic peace means we cannot be certain the peace is genuine. It may be an epi-
phenomenon, a by-product of other causal variables such as those suggested by real-
ist theories of inter-national politics.’ (Owen, 1994, p. 88)
Note the expression ‘causal mechanism’ by both authors. Talk of ‘mechanisms’ in these 
kinds of explanatory contexts is routine. But what is meant by ‘mechanism’ here? That’s 
a good question, with lots of candidate answers. Look at Figure 1 from a review article 
in a sociology journal. It lists 24 different definitions, and, although some philosophers 
are there, this list does not include our structural mechanists, Bechtel, MDC or Glen-
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nan,26 all of whom had published on mechanisms by then, nor Mario Bunge (1997), 
who spoke at the Conference on Social Mechanisms at the Royal Swedish Academy of 
Sciences in 1996.
Mechanisms Mach 3
I promised at the start of these lectures to sort out from this morass three distinct senses of 
‘mechanism’ that I see at play in contemporary philosophy and in the human sciences. Two 
we have looked at already: mechanisms in the sense of underlying structures and mecha-
nisms in the sense of causal-chain models, both of which, I have argued, are essential ingre-
dients in a good mid-range process/interaction theory.
Consider again the theories of the democratic peace discussed in Lecture 2. Many 
of these are obviously mechanistic theories in the step-by-step sense. Mechanism in the 
structural sense is also implicated: ‘democracy’, I have suggested, works as a marker for a 
pair of countries whose structures make the causal pathway from tension to war unlikely; 
also central structural features of democracies are pointed to in the labelling of the inter-
mediate steps in the causal pathways postulated by explanatory theories of the democratic 
peace. The third sense is there as well when activities are described and ‘mechanisms’ are 
called into play to stand behind them. I call these last mechanisms ‘middle-range law’ 
mechanisms because they figure as general precepts in description, explanation and pre-
diction in the human sciences in much the way I see ‘laws’ functioning widely in science. 
This Lecture is dedicated to trying to make sense of them and to understanding their use-
fulness.
Consider familiar calls for an account of the mechanism by which the cause produces 
its effect. For instance, from Hedström and Swedberg’s ‘Introductory Essay’ to the collec-
tion, Social Mechanisms:
Assume that we have observed a systematic relationship between two entities, say I and O. In 
order to explain the relationship between them we search for a mechanism, M, which is such that 
on the occurrence of the cause or input, I, it generates the effect or outcome, O. ... a mechanism 
can be seen as a systematic set of statements that provide a plausible account of how I and O are 
linked to one another. (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998, p. 7)
And from Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba’s classic text Designing Social In-
quiry:
Some scholars argue the central idea of causality is that of a set of ‘causal mechanisms’ posited 
to exist between cause and effect. This view makes intuitive sense: any coherent account of causal-
ity needs to specify how the effects are exerted. (King et al., 1994, p. 8)
For a good theory the answer to how takes a special form. As I urged in Lecture 2, just de-
scribing the activity is not enough. A good theory should also provide an account of why 
that activity can produce the targeted outcome. This presupposes that the outcome is not an 
26 Recall Lecture 1.
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idiosyncratic result of the activity. Rather it is ‘recyclable’: there is some regularity and sys-
tematicity to it. As Jon Elster argues in his widely-cited account:
Roughly speaking, mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal pat-
terns… (Elster, 2015, p. 26)
Still, there seem to be two big troubles with the claim that Elster-type mechanisms can 
function as precepts in social science.
First, as Elster says, mechanisms of this kind may be useful for explanation, but they are 
generally short on descriptive and predictive power, which are hallmarks of good science:
— They are too malleable. They are too unconstrained about which situations they 
cover and which not.
As Elster himself says, continuing from the previous quote:
…that are triggered under generally unknown conditions… (Elster, 2015, p. 26)
If the conditions that trigger a mechanism are unknown, whenever the expected outcome 
does not obtain when a mechanism obtains it seems all too easy to attribute that to a failure of 
triggering. There seems to be no way to police such excuses. So these kinds of precepts seem to 
be unfalsifiable and whatever conclusions we draw using them to be unworthy of trust.
Second, despite their malleability:
— They don’t stretch far enough. They don’t even cover all the situations they are sup-
posed to explain.
In fact they may sometimes cover nothing at all. There is all too often no pattern to be 
found. As Elster continues, they also frequently have
…indeterminate consequences. (Elster, 2015, p. 26)
One reason for this is that a mechanism seldom operates on its own. We sometimes pre-
tend they do when trying to describe their ‘natural’ outcomes. But that makes no sense. 
Mechanisms don’t operate in some kind of Platonic heaven ‘all by themselves’. They oper-
ate in real settings. And in real settings other real things have influence as well. So the char-
acteristic behaviour we associate with a mechanism is often not what we should expect to 
happen when the mechanism operates.
I shall argue that neither of these problems bar these middle-range law mechanisms 
from the halls of scientific knowledge once we embrace —as we should— a communi-
ty-practice centred instrumentalist account of scientific laws, or at least of this type of scien-
tific law. We should not try to cash out Elster-type mechanisms as (hopefully true) claims 
from which we could, with additional (true) premises, derive explanations, predictions and 
descriptions. They are generally not claims at all. They are rather precepts, formulae, max-
ims that we may learn how to use to build claims about what happens in nature.27 This, I 
27 In commenting on this Lecture, JC Gonzales (‘Mechanism & Middle-level Laws’. Dept. of Philos-
ophy, UCSD, 2019) draws an extended comparison between my claim here and the views of John 
Haugeland (2017).
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maintain, is true for a good many of our scientific laws across both the natural and the so-
cial sciences. I develop this view in detail in Nature, the Artful Modeler (Cartwright, 2019). 
I mention it here only to suggest that the social sciences may not be peculiar in this respect. 
But it is not necessary for middle-range laws in social science to work like laws in physics, 
biology and chemistry. What really matters is whether the basic ideas of community-prac-
tice centred instrumentalism can be developed to show how middle-range law mechanisms 
in social science can be both credible and useful for scientific explanation, description and 
prediction.
The centrality of community learning and community practices is underlined in the 
US National Academy of Science’s [NAS] ‘Definition of Science’ (from their 2008 book-
let, Science, Evolution, and Creationism):
Scientific knowledge and understanding accumulate from the interplay of observation and 
explanation. Scientists gather information by observing the natural world and conducting exper-
iments. They then propose how the systems being studied behave in general, basing their expla-
nations on the data provided through their experiments and other observations. They test their 
explanations by conducting additional observations and experiments under different conditions. 
Other scientists confirm the observations independently and carry out additional studies that 
may lead to more sophisticated explanations and predictions about future observations and ex-
periments…
Because observations and explanations build on each other, science is a cumulative activity. 
Repeatable observations and experiments generate explanations that describe nature more accu-
rately and comprehensively, and these explanations in turn suggest new observations and exper-
iments that can be used to test and extend the explanation. In this way, the sophistication and 
scope of scientific explanations improve over time, as subsequent generations of scientists, often 
using technological innovations, work to correct, refine, and extend the work done by their pre-
decessors.28
Note the interplay of activities: correcting, refining, extending. This claim by the NAS is 
not news. Nor is it philosophically controversial. The process of mutual adjustment of the 
ingredients to make a stable structure is well-known. But we have little in the way of philo-
sophic accounts of it, or of the ingredients that go into it or of how it supplies epistemic se-
curity. Philosophy has tended to focus on one kind of fit or other at one point of contact or 
other, most notoriously between a well-formulated hypothesis with well-defined concepts 
and either an experiment or a body of data. This leaves out way too much of the diverse 
tangle of practices that go into making successful science.
The work I report here is part of a new project with Jeremy Hardie and Eleonora Mon-
tuschi (Cartwright et. al., forthcoming) aiming to show how the right kind of tangle makes 
for trustworthy science. The central question is not whether these practices are important 
to and characteristic of science but rather ‘Do they provide sufficient epistemology to make 
our science credible?’ Hasok Chang offers a serious case that they do,29 at least as I interpret 
him. His focus is on the coherence of the practices, which we agree is important. We think 
much else matters as well in the nature of the tangle itself. What makes for credibility, we 
28 https://www.nap.edu/catalog/11876/science-evolution-and-creationism. Accessed 31 March 2019, 
p. 10.
29 Chang (2017) and watch also for his forthcoming book.
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are so far suggesting, is a network of practices —what we shall call a ‘virtuous tangle’30— 
that have a ‘sufficient’31 mix of several key features.
To be virtuous the network of practices should be
a) dense —there should be a great many of them.
b) diverse —they should be the ‘right’ mix where what is right depends on context; 
they are not, for example, all just studies (or even worse, studies of the same kind).
c) tangled —they should be mutually scrutinising, as we have seen in Lecture 1 in the 
simple example of the three components that make up a measure.
d) long-tailed —they should have lots of connections with practices far from their core.
e) able to accommodate a large amount of otherwise established knowledge (both 
knowledge that and knowledge how).
This is clearly a big claim. Here I want to borrow these ideas to defend the scientific legit-
imacy of middle-range law mechanisms. Specifically I want to argue that middle-range law 
mechanisms use loose language and they can almost never be recast as true claims. Never-
theless they can be credible if they are embedded in a dense tangle of highly contested di-
verse middle-range theorising practices with long tails that accommodate knowledge and 
practices otherwise deemed acceptable. This is still a big claim, one that I will not hope to 
nail down here. But I do aim to get a start defending it by illustrating it with the case of the 
DPT. I hope at least to show that this is a promising programme for safeguarding the scien-
tific status of Elster-type middle-range law mechanisms.
I shall turn first to the worry about the truth of middle-range law mechanisms. But 
that discussion will soon bleed into an examination of the worries about their loose lan-
guage since it is the thick, mutually supporting tangle of contested practice that I believe 
can solve both.
Before the philosophy, I should make an historical note. As Hedström and Swedberg note, 
‘It was Robert Merton who brought together the idea of mechanism with that of middle-range 
theorising ... Merton firmly rejected all attempts to develop general systems of sociological 
theory and advocated instead that sociological theory should deal with “social mechanisms.” 
The point is to locate a middle ground between social laws and description, Merton said, and 
“mechanisms” constitute such a middle ground.’ (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998, p. 5-6).
Instrumentalism: why not?
Often we talk as if the mechanism is something there in a setting that is responsible, in tan-
dem with other factors, for what happens. Sometimes this may be fine. For instance, many 
of the mechanisms that Elster describes or that are deployed in social science explanations 
seem like familiar dispositions that we ascribe to individuals or institutions. But when we 
try to understand this in detail we are faced with a host of vexing questions that plague 
metaphysics —What is a disposition? Is it grounded in a counterfactual conditional? Can 
institutions really have them or only individuals? And so on. I think we can avoid going 
into these kinds of questions. To do so, I propose to move from the material mode to the 
30 Thanks to Alison Wylie for the name.
31 What counts as sufficient will be context-specific and is not an all-or-none matter.
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formal, to characterise Elster-type mechanisms not in terms of things in the world but in-
stead in terms of middle-range laws or precepts and the accompanying practices that use 
these to help describe and predict things in the world.
On a conventional realist view of laws this won’t make a difference. The laws we use 
to predict phenomena are supposed to cover those phenomena: (descriptions of) the phe-
nomena follow from those laws. And in principle these laws are supposed to be (at least ap-
proximately) true. So those laws can’t be right where the associated patterns fail.
I urge that they can indeed be right. They just can’t be true. This should be no surprise. 
Hardly ever do we find the kind of thing we call a law or a principle expressed in proposi-
tional form. This is just what we should expect given the view I want to defend that they 
are not claims at all. They are rather tools, tools we deploy, along with a whole kit of oth-
ers, to build concrete models that can provide claims about real happenings. This is in ac-
cord with what Mauricio Suárez, Towfic Shomar and I argued in ‘The Toolbox of Science’. 
(Cartwright et al., 1995).32
That important laws of science are frequently not true is a familiar theme from me. It 
is the meat of my first book, How the Laws of Physics Lie. After that I lost interest in sci-
entific realism, becoming more concerned with questions about causal inference, model-
ling and how we use the laws of physics, independent of whether they are true, for instance 
in designing and building a laser. But the work on lasers, which I pursued with Suárez and 
Shomar in our LSE project on modelling, reinforced my early views that laws are not claims 
from which we infer models. We don’t infer, we build. We use the laws in ways an ex-
tended community of scientists and engineers have learned and have trained each other to 
do. There is good, experienced practice, trial and error, maxims, rules of thumb. But there 
are few rules about how to use them. The laws, Suárez, Shomar and I argued, are tools in 
the toolbox of science. Good, reliable models are built by scientists and engineers experi-
enced in the use of these tools, often employing modules they couldn’t construct them-
selves and that are built by other practitioners experienced in the use of other tools.
That’s an instrumentalist view. No question. And I think there is no trouble defend-
ing it as the best view around about laws and principles, across the sciences. But I was reluc-
tant to embrace it entirely. For bad reason. In my youth I was introduced to the ‘inference 
ticket’ version of instrumentalism, and I couldn’t shake this off. There are several reasons 
to avoid this metaphoric label. ‘Inference ticket’ sounds like a license or permission to go 
from A to B by inferring B from A. But:
1. That suggests you can read the ticket and recognise the destination. Yet these laws 
play only a small part in fixing what B is to be.
2. ‘License’/‘permission’ is the language of rules. But there are few rules, though there 
are many honed practices.
3. The concepts the laws use —like priming or implicit bias— and the specific func-
tional forms —Gm1m2/r 2— matter to how they are deployed. It is hard to find 
place for this on the inference ticket view.
32 It also dovetails nicely with the ‘Context-mechanism-outcome’ frame of realist evaluation defended in-
ter alia by Pawson and Tilley (1997) and growing out of the ‘critical realism’ of Bhaskar (2008). But 
note that what realist evaluators call ‘context’ generally covers both what in these lectures I call structure 
and what I have labelled the ‘support factors’ and ‘derailers’ for the mechanism given that structure. 
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4. There is no A to start from. It is not some body of claims that makes our models 
credible. It is the tangle of finely honed, critically contested practices in the hands 
of skilled practitioners.
Recently I have returned to work on these issues, partly stirred by Hasok Chang’s prag-
matic realism and the work of Philip Kitcher and others that has brought pragmatism alive 
in our field again. But also —what matters here— by a drive to make sense of this wide-
spread use of ‘mechanisms’ in social science explanation and prediction. What was missing 
from my youthful worries about instrumentalism was sufficient attention to the interlock-
ing practices that go into deploying these instruments.
We know what to do with our well-tested principles to build good predictive and de-
scriptive models —that is part of what it is to be well-tested. And, with respect to worry 3, 
what that is depends heavily on the notions and formulae the principles employ. I use the 
word ‘know’ intentionally. How these principles are used to build successful models is not 
accidental nor haphazard. It develops and evolves (in its own way, case-by-case). The way 
these notions and principles are used is generally complex, learning how to do it takes a lot 
of careful, detailed training, often imagination as well, and training in one set of application 
domains does not generally equip one to apply the same principles in others. Sometime 
things go wrong. But they mustn’t do so too often or the principles and surrounding prac-
tices will need overhauling. Although the boundaries are vague, there will be clear ad hoc 
uses. When these are successful, it is generally accepted that more work needs to be done, 
developing the network of theory and practice to bring them into the corral or to explain 
why this ad hoc move works when it seems it shouldn’t.
Explanation and prediction
Thus far I have been playing fast and loose with the notion of explanation. I don’t think 
the points I want to make require any specific account of scientific explanation, but 
there is one distinction that I think is important here. It is in line with Karl Popper’s ob-
jections to the theories of Freud and Marx, which he maintained could explain almost 
anything. A plausible explanation of an individual’s behaviour is offered, but had just the 
opposite behaviour occurred, the same theoretical principles could have been invoked to 
explain it, just filling in a different story. There is nothing in principle wrong with that 
from a scientific point of view. I can use the theory of gravity to explain both a pin’s fall-
ing and its rising by filling in further facts about the presence or absence of a magnet. 
The trouble from Popper’s point of view is that, with the theories he did not like, what 
further information could be added and just what role it could play was dramatically un-
der-policed within Marx’s and Freud’s theories. Explanations like that are often called 
‘just-so stories’.
What about explanations with Elster-type middle-range law mechanisms? Many of 
these will be just-so stories. We can often imagine details that could be added to the nar-
rative that could couple with the same principle to explain a contrary outcome. Note that 
here the issue is not that there may be opposing mechanisms that point to contradictory 
outcomes but rather that one and the same mechanism can (help) account for opposing 
outcomes.
I urge that we follow Popper here in opposing just-so stories in science. For an expla-
nation to be scientifically credible it has to be scientifically justifiable as an explanation. We 
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have to have evolved practices, that together, and together with the facts we can learn about 
a case, are sufficient for us to say: ‘Yes, that is a legitimate application of this mechanism’. 
The practices must be sufficiently developed to give a verdict and that verdict should not 
be highly contested in the case at hand.
Theories that do not have enough methods of constraint built in to provide scientif-
ically credible explanations will also suffer when it comes to prediction. As Christopher 
Hitchcock and Elliott Sober put it: if a theory is ‘sufficiently plastic that it can accommo-
date any data that may come along, it is in no position to make predictions about what data 
will come along.’ (Hitchcock and Sober, 2004, p. 7)
Philosophy of science has long been concerned with issues about the symmetry of ex-
planation and prediction. That is not being assumed here. To require that a post hoc sci-
entific explanation employing specific mechanisms be justifiable as an explanation is not 
to require that that explanation could have allowed us to use the same mechanisms to pre-
dict the happening explained before the fact with enough non-prescient information, for at 
least a couple of reasons:
— Many mechanisms are probabilistic or need triggering, and very often the disposi-
tions or arrangements supporting many different mechanisms that can affect the 
same outcome are in place, including ones that point in opposite directions, as El-
ster stresses. We can’t tell beforehand which will operate. But there can be ample 
evidence afterward about that.
— As noted already, few outcomes are the result of the operation of a single mecha-
nism. So even when we have a detailed understanding of a mechanism, and even 
when we are able to predict when it is likely to operate, we may be in a poor po-
sition to predict what will happen because we do not have the same deep under-
standing of the other significant mechanisms that will have an effect. This is well 
illustrated in economics where the theory surrounding specific mechanisms can 
be honed and honed until it seems the mechanism is well understood; neverthe-
less, it is useful for prediction only in special circumstances where it is the domi-
nant mechanism at work. (For examples of economic mechanisms see Angus De-
aton (2010), which also illustrates how mechanisms get corrected, honed and 
refined.)
— Even when we have a good understanding of the different significant mechanisms 
that will operate in a situation, we often lack nice ‘rules of combination’ sufficient 
to predict what happens when they operate together. But again there can be am-
ple evidence afterward to trace how they operated together to produce what hap-
pened.
— A very great many income/outcome pairs we study are separated by a long sequence 
of steps in between, as we saw in discussing causal processes in Lecture 2. Each step 
must obtain if the final outcome is to be achieved. But each will depend on differ-
ent mechanisms, with often (as above) more than one likely to operate at any given 
step, and each mechanism will have different support factors necessary for it to op-
erate. This makes prediction difficult, whereas post hoc explanation may well be 
possible.
Let’s look at this in DPT.
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Democratic Peace Theorising
The idea of the democratic peace has been around since the 1960’s (Babst, 1964). It became 
big business in the 1990’s and continues to be so today.33 Work on the democratic peace in-
volves thousands of studies and thousands of academic papers. In Lecture 1 I noted that de-
mocracy might be used as a marker for structures that make war an unlikely outcome of 
conflict. I think it is right to reconstruct its use as that of a marker and not, for example, an 
Elster-type mechanism, for a couple of reasons. First, DPT explanation schema like those rep-
resented in Figures 2 and 3 in Lecture 2 involve a number of successive stages, with different 
middle-range law mechanisms supposed to operate at different stages. Second, DPT advo-
cates argue that the democratic peace holds almost exceptionlessly. This suggests that they 
are treating ‘democracies don’t go to war with democracies’ as a claim —albeit a very loose 
one until the concepts are all well-defined and quantifiers inserted. This does not fit readily 
with the idea that democracy is a mechanism for peace, given that the ‘natural’ outcome of a 
mechanism is seldom what we can expect to happen when that mechanism is present, due to 
the action of other mechanisms, the possible failure of triggers and of support factors and the 
chance of derailers. This fits more naturally if we take ‘democracy’ as a marker —find a de-
mocracy and you will find a structure in which conflicts with other democracies get resolved 
short of war— in this case, as advocates would have it, a highly reliable marker.
Is it a reliable marker? Is it true that democracies don’t go to war with democracies? In 
what sense of democracy? Of war? Why think the association is not just accidental? DPT 
has produced hundreds of explanations of individual cases that are supposed to fall under it 
or may seem deviant. Why trust these, and which ones? Though I don’t look at any of this 
here, a vast amount of critical work has gone into investigating each of these issues.
I did however look briefly at another strand in the DPT tangle: samples of each of the 
three components of measures for the concept ‘democracy’. Recall the need to get these 
three components to mesh. Here we are in familiar philosophic territory; namely, the de-
mand for a theory of the instrument: how do we know that our instruments do what they 
are supposed to? Think then of the vast network of further work —sub-theorising— that 
must go into arguing that practical on-the-ground procedures that are offered can deliver 
the right information about the concept to be measured, especially since so many of our 
procedures look at indirect indicators postulated to have calculable connection back to the 
concept of interest.
Developing measures is just one among a myriad of interlocking activities that go into the-
orising the democratic peace. Here is a catalogue of different types that I have observed there:
— Development of new concepts (that social scientists sometimes call ‘constructs’)
— Arguments to establish construct validity for the concepts employed
— Development of measures for these concepts —many different ones
— Development of ‘bridging’ theories to defend that these are good measures
— Ensuring there is theoretical and empirical support for these bridging theories, 
which often involves information from different, sometimes distant, domains
33 For example, Rosato (2003); Farnham (2002); Hegre et al. (2018); University of Gothenburg: Varie-
ties of Democracy Institute: https://www.v-dem.net/en/news-publications/working-papers/; Weisi-
ger and Gartzke (2016); Choi (2016) and Tomz and Weeks (2013).
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— Development of well formulated hypotheses
— Testing of alternative hypotheses
— Statistical analyses, especially correlations and partial correlations of a vast variety of 
different sorts
— Case studies
— Considerations of which case studies are the ones to pursue
— Process tracing
— Historical and archival work (e.g. looking at newspapers, correspondence, official 
records)
— Ethnographic studies
— Experiments34
— Postulation of new middle-range law mechanisms
— Building models and explanation schema
— Figuring out how to implement strategies suggested by these models
— Developing hundreds of individual case explanations
— Lots of connections with work outside the democratic peace theorising community
Figure 2
Constructed by John Pemberton
I put these in a list here. But for the credibility of the DPT practices and of explanations 
constructed with them, it matters that they are thickly interwoven and mutually support-
ing and constraining, as in the tangle in Figure 2. In these Lectures I have given only one 
example of this kind of mutual support and constraint, in Lecture 1 where I illustrated how 
34 Since experimentation can seem unlikely for this subject matter, I provide a few references: Tomz and 
Weeks (2013) and Geva and Hanson (1999). 
 Nancy Cartwright
314 Theoria, 2020, 35/3, 269-323
the design of a good measure requires the right meshing of characterization, representation 
and procedures. If you look at the list above, I think it will be immediately plausible that 
the results of what each of these practices can constrain will have implications for many 
others. But showing how that works in detail in the case of DPT is research still in progress, 
so I will not venture further on it now.
What I will do here in defence of middle-range law mechanisms is now to tackle di-
rectly my worries about loose language.
Why loose language needn’t matter
It seems I can readily be accused of inconsistency. I began Lecture 1 with a complaint about 
evidence-based policy: ‘My second shock in engaging with EBP was with the exceedingly 
sloppy language employed throughout. According to conventional EBP wisdom, by careful 
review of the research evidence we can learn “What Works” … But: what on earth could “It 
works” mean?’ I have lectured about this both to philosophers and to EBP communities, 
driving home the point with the UK World War II slogan, ‘Loose talk costs lives’.
Yet here I endorse middle-range law mechanisms not formulated as proper proposi-
tions and employing loosely characterised concepts. There is a difference though. There 
are maybe a hundred different definitions of democracy on offer in the DPT community, 
most with appropriately matched measures. Their use for different purposes and in differ-
ent contexts is heavily critically debated, as is the correctness of the central DPT precept 
given various definitions of democracy, in tandem with various definitions of the concepts 
that go into those definitions (like defining ‘competitiveness of executive recruitment’), in 
tandem with the same for ‘war’ and its defining concepts, in tandem with different ways of 
testing the extent to which any of these ‘precisified’ claims are true or could be relied on for 
different purposes in different contexts.
Nothing like this is the case for ‘works’ in ‘It works’. Recall Read 180, where the What 
Works Clearing House reports ‘Strong evidence of a positive effect [on comprehension] 
with no overriding contrary evidence.’35 In cases like this the WWC will have provided a 
fairly precise characterisation of what both ‘Read 180’ and ‘comprehension’ consists in. It 
will also be clear about the criteria for ‘strong evidence of a positive effect with no overrid-
ing contrary evidence’ and you would be able to bore down and find out which studies are 
supposed to have provided that evidence.
That is all admirably precise, just what we should expect in credible science. But what 
about after that: ‘It works’. In this case ‘it’ is Read 180, for which we have a precise meaning. 
It’s the ‘works’ bit that is troubling, and it remains so even if we replace ‘It works’ by ‘Read 
180 has a positive effect on comprehension’. This is every bit as flabby and generic as a good 
many social-science middle-range law mechanisms, for instance, cognitive dissonance: ‘Peo-
ple seek consistency among their cognitions and feel discomfort when it is missing’.
But that, in my view, need not be a problem. In both cases they could be tools to use in 
building concrete descriptions, explanations or predictions for real situations. The problem is 
that in the Read 180 case we have little know-how, no good, thick tangle of practices surround-
ing the development of predictions and explanations, whereas by now we do with the demo-
35 https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/Docs/InterventionReports/wwc_read180_112916.pdf
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cratic peace, and, I suspect, with cognitive dissonance as well. Read 180 is not totally lacking 
thicker work though. It comes with a theory of change, which is why I chose it as an example 
in the first place, and its developers have made some efforts to connect it with various learning 
and psychological theories. Many other programmes that make it into approved lists in What 
Works sites do not have even this to recommend them as tools for planning and prediction.
The conclusion I want to draw from this discussion is that the fact that a middle-range 
law mechanism is loose does not mean that its use is uncontrolled. In the 1950s and 60s, 
philosophers concerned about Popper’s charge of falsifiability distinguished the internal 
principles of a theory from the bridge principles. The bridge principles serve to police the 
application of the theory to the world. But we don’t need principles to do this job. Princi-
ples fall in the category of knowledge-that. We can equally do it with knowledge-how, re-
flected in a thick tangle of critically evolved practices.
Getting epistemic security
I propose that there are three elements that underwrite the credibility of explanatory mod-
els and predictions developed with the use of middle-range law mechanisms.
The first is reflected in the National Academy of Science’s focus on the interplay of ac-
tivities that I quoted at the start: ‘[T]he sophistication and scope of scientific explanations 
improve over time, as subsequent generations of scientists, often using technological in-
novations, work to correct, refine, and extend the work done by their predecessors.’ What 
is involved in ‘correcting, refining and extending’? I propose that these be understood in 
terms of developing a virtuous tangle. So I urge that:
1. The development of the model should be embedded in a network of mutually sup-
porting practices satisfying my five criteria a)-e).
The second comes from the US National Research Council’s testimony to the US Con-
gress on findings from the NRC 2002 report, Scientific Research in Education, which is at 
pains to suggest that Congress should not be legislating scientific method:
The NRC report makes clear that the objectivity and progress of scientific understanding 
in any field…derives not from a given methodology or a given person. Rather, it comes from the 
community of researchers…. who embrace high standards of quality. (Taken from Eisenhart and 
Towne, 2003, p. 35)
The importance of the structure and habits of the research community is common fare in 
Science Studies and there is now a great deal of work in epistemology and in philosophy of 
science (from Helen Longino (1990) and others) on what about the community makes for 
the objectivity of its results. I refer you there for more discussion. I propose to follow their 
lead and add as a second major contribution to its credibility that
2. The work is carried out in a research community that works to ‘high standards of 
quality’ with an eye to each other’s practices in order to ‘correct, refine and extend’ 
the community know-how.
The third is a tenet of everyday common-sense epistemology that I think works equally 
well in science: for reliable description, explanation or prediction, stick to the tried-and-
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true. Consider a familiar contrast. I differ from my neighbour. He usually buys the newest, 
latest models of new goods; I, the boring old-fashioned ones. Why? I hate fussing. I want 
something that does what I have learned to expect of it the first time, every time. He is ex-
cited by novelty, wants the things he invests in to be fun and to do what he could not have 
done otherwise. For the excitement of this he is willing to put up with glitches, maybe lots 
of them. We have a difference in attitudes to adventure and to bottom-line functionality, 
but we do not have an epistemic difference. We agree that my purchase is more likely to do 
the good old tired-and-true than his and that his has a real chance of that new next step, 
which mine does not. It is the well-rehearsed tried-and-true practices, the next model as 
close as possible to ones already established as highly successful, that have the most chance 
of doing what we expect of them. It is the tangle of experienced practices that provides 
epistemic security. I trust that my device will work because of the web of repeatedly suc-
cessful practices that has produced it. So:
3. The closer a predictive, explanatory or descriptive model is to ones that have been 
honed and tested and that have proved repeatedly successful in cases like this, 
where judgments of likeness are themselves backed up by a thick tangle of honed 
practices, the better. The further away, the more reason to hedge our bets.36
Admittedly we often cannot stick to the tried-and-true. We face new problems with new 
aspects to them — we need new solutions. My claim then is not that it is always best to 
stick to the tried-and-true but rather that the further we venture away from it the more 
epistemically insecure our productions.
Where has all the evidence gone?
We philosophers are in the habit of thinking in terms of well-formulated hypotheses and 
specific pieces of evidence for these hypotheses. That seems to play little role in my story. 
That is not entirely true though. Return to the case of my more adventuresome neighbour 
and myself. He hazards that the new device will work as promised on the basis of the evi-
dence the manufacturer adduces for it. It is not that I fail to look at their claims, nor that 
I think these claims are false,37 nor that I fail to understand the force they are supposed to 
have. It is just that evidence is not enough to provide the high level of epistemic security 
that I, unlike my neighbour, demand. Nor am I interested in any specific well-formulated 
claim. It is all too easy for manufacturers to pick some specific precisifications of this claim 
that can be well evidenced for products that are not really fit for purpose. I want instead to 
be assured there is a large tangle of practice supporting the loose precept, ‘the new device 
will do all I expect of it’.
It may seem that here again I am being grossly inconsistent. I have spent a great deal 
of time in the last few years developing and defending a theory of evidence, the ‘Argu-
ment Theory’. I have offered it as a theory of evidence, ‘For policy and wheresoever rigour 
36 As always this is ‘ceteris paribus’ advice, and of course we can always be mistaken about how close the 
model is or about how similar in the right respects the case at hand is to ones where the model has 
worked.
37 Though I often suspect that, that is not my point here.
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is a must’ (as the title of my monograph puts it (Cartwright, 2013)). And surely rigour is a 
must in making policy predictions, or in any other areas where people’s welfare is at stake.
Yes. I agree. But the overall effect of the Argument Theory should be to make us cau-
tious in our claims to have evidence for our predictions. On the Argument Theory, there is 
no fact of the matter about whether a fact e is evidence for hypothesis H. Evidence is not 
a 2-place relation but a 3-place relation. In the third place sit the reasons —the additional 
premises— that show why e is relevant to the truth of H. This is a version of the familiar 
need for auxiliary assumptions. Relative to one set of assumptions e can be evidence for H, 
and relative to another, that same e can be evidence for -H. For instance, Marilena DiBuc-
chianico (2009) tells the story of two warring camps with opposed theories of high-temper-
ature superconductivity. Each, because of their different background assumptions, took a 
newly discovered ‘kink’ in the experimental data to be evidence in favour of their own the-
ory and against the opponent’s.
So, where does the tangle of practice enter? Generally, the argument that establishes 
that e is relevant to H will involve a great many auxiliary assumptions and new concepts. 
e’s claim to relevance is no more credible than the union of these assumptions and the va-
lidity of all the concepts involved. In happy cases, at least some of these may already be ‘es-
tablished’ or ‘well understood’ —we are entitled just to assume them. But that is not the 
norm. Whether we have evidence at all for our hypotheses is up for grabs then. To make 
the relevance claims credible, we need to render the assumptions credible and the concepts 
valid. And we need further credible assumptions and probably further new concepts to as-
sure the relevance of the evidence adduced for the earlier ones.
The trouble I want to raise here is not that this could be a bottomless regress but rather 
how dicey it makes e’s claim to relevance. It doesn’t take much to upset it. One response is 
to note that there may be many routes —many different sets of auxiliaries— which if true 
would render e relevant to H. We could suppose that at least one is likely to be true. An-
other strategy is to notice that we may have other results that look to be evidence for H as 
well. We could suppose that at least one of these is likely to be relevant. But what supports 
these suppositions? If evidence is required for credibility, we should have evidence for that, 
genuine evidence, not wishful thinking. And remember, all this is just about e’s relevance 
to H —does it speak for H’s truth?— before we begin to consider how loudly it speaks. My 
worry is that if we stick merely to the evidence game, we will have a hard time genuinely 
providing warrant for our claims.
Consider a claim involving Read 180, which requires expensive software and the time 
and money for staff training.38 Suppose you are a California middle-school principal with 
a lot of children in your school who have recently immigrated from China and are reading 
38 The WWC Intervention Report says, ‘As of January 2017, the initial start-up cost of a READ 180® 
Universal package for 60 students was approximately $43,000. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (HMH) 
provides 1 day of in-person professional development, a 2-hour webinar, and eLearning courses with 
the purchase of the program. A READ 180® Universal upgrade kit for 30 students costs $11,000 and 
includes teacher materials, two HMH Teacher Central licenses, 30 ReaL Books, six boxes of Independ-
ent Reading Library books, access to the new online student application, and 30 HMH Student Cen-
tral licenses. An upgrade kit with 60 student licenses costs $15,000. There are also upgrade and full 
package options available for classes of 15 students. https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/Docs/Intervention-
Reports/wwc_read180_112916.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2019.
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at least two years below grade level. What warrants the prediction that Read 180 will bring 
their comprehension up to grade level? You will be told to look to the WWC for help. The 
WWC gives a ++ rating for Read 180 with respect to adolescent comprehension.39 That 
rating is based on 6 studies, where in their own words, ‘In the six studies that reported find-
ings, the estimated impact of the intervention on outcomes in the com prehension domain 
was positive and statistically significant for two studies, one of which meets WWC group 
design standards without reservations, positive and substantively important for one study, 
and indeterminate for three studies.’40 (Another 117 did not meet their eligibility criteria 
to be reviewed and of the 39 reviewed,41 the designs of 30 were not up to snuff so their re-
sults were ignored though they might have played a role in the tangle!). What further as-
sumptions make any or all of these relevant to your prediction? What makes effect sizes in 
these studies relevant to yours?
Jeremy Hardie and I have laid out two necessary and sufficient conditions for the same 
effect size to hold in your setting as in some others (Cartwright and Hardie, 2012):
— The mean value of the (net effect of) the support factors is the same in both.
— There’s a causal pathway from Read 180 to better comprehension scores in your 
setting.
The first depends on information about support factors which you are not given. The sec-
ond, as we saw in Lecture 1, depends on the underlying structure in your school setting 
with your students. What evidence do you have that yours is sufficiently like that in the 
study setting, or alternatively, if it is different, that it is nevertheless the right kind to afford 
the Read 180 pathway? Also, which of the studies can you make a relevance argument for? 
They all had different results. Maybe though that is okay because all the results that were 
not indeterminate were positive. Is the fact that these 3 were positive relevant to the pre-
diction that you will have positive results? If so, what are the additional assumptions that 
show this?
This would all be easier if we could just suppose what seems to be implied by ‘It 
works’— ‘Read 180 works (almost) everywhere’. It follows that it will work for you. But 
how good is the evidence for that? 3 studies? Or even many more? There are more than 
2000 swans in the Thames, and in the right season, more than 40,000 in the UK. All white. 
Still in Sydney Harbour we know we can find black swans.
Alternatively, ‘Read 180 works’ is a loose precept (like ‘Democracies don’t go to war with 
democracies’), to be used as a tool in our toolbox. Now we are back to the problem I raised 
earlier: ‘[I]n the Read 180 case we have little know-how, no good, thick tangle of practices 
surrounding the development of predictions and explanations, whereas by now we do with 
the democratic peace.’ When I raise these issues about the thinness of the evidence base sup-
plied in What Works sites for policy prediction, questioning even its claims to relevance, I am 
asked, ‘What’s the alternative?’ So I turned to thinking about why I was willing to trust the 
predictions that the Excimer Laser used in my eye surgery would emit a precise wavelength of 
39 https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/intervention/742. Accessed 2 April 2019.
40 WWC Intervention Report on Read 180. Retrieved from https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/Docs/Inter-
ventionReports/wwc_read180_112916.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2019. Note that the 6 studies did in-
clude 3882 students in 61 schools.
41 Only 6 of the 9 reported results on comprehension.
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cool ultraviolet light that would not burn my eye. It wasn’t just the quantum theory that reas-
sured me. It was the tangle of practices that I had studied in Stanford in theorising, designing 
and building lasers that gave me faith. But it won’t help in the policy domain to use physics 
and engineering cases. ‘Physics has true universal laws to work with. We don’t.’ That is why I 
have turned to the democratic peace. It is an exemplar of good social science theorising, with a 
thick tangle of practice that allows it to build good explanatory models of real conflict interac-
tions between real countries. But how credible are these explanations?
Following my third element for underwriting credibility, my strategy would be to trust 
only models that are ‘tried-and-true’, that different practices converge on, that sit ‘in the 
centre of the tangle.’ This is familiar advice: trust most to what is overdetermined. And it is 
a core part of good social science methodology. We can turn to DPT for illustration. Here 
are some examples, all from Bruce Russett’s short book Grasping the Democratic Peace:
— ‘Even with the differing definitions of democracy and of war, this generalization is 
exceedingly robust.’ [The generalization: in the 20th century ‘war between democra-
cies becomes impossible or almost impossible to find’.] (Russett, 1994, p. 20)
— Two sets of data [ICB and MID] on conflict don’t treat all the same dyads. ‘This 
does not mean that either set is inaccurate; rather, they vary enough in how they 
identify cases for us to use the two data sets as a check on how robust our results 
are.’ (Russett, 1994, p. 76)
— ‘As a further check we created an alternative scheme of regime categories from data 
of Arthur Banks…’ (Russett, 1994, p. 77)
— The tables used usually presented data on the independent variable in continuous 
or categorical form. ‘Most analysis was also done by analysing all the independent 
variables as dichotomous.’ (Russett, 1994, p. 84)
— ‘[T]o be sure the outlier was not unduly responsible for the explanatory power of 
the political variables we re-estimated the equation without it.’ (Russett, 1994, 
p. 107)
With this advice in mind what applications seem sound? As Russett reports, the US has 
used covert forcible actions against a number of elected governments of less-developed 
countries, for example Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957), Brazil (1961), 
Chile (1973), Nicaragua (1981). Should we have bet against these on grounds of the 
Democratic peace? If we did, we should have known to hedge our bets since these were 
not wars under many of the characterisations of wars on offer in DPT, and ‘these govern-
ments were not fully democratic according to the criteria that have been applied here…’ 
(Russett, 1994, p. 121). Predictions against these covert actions do not come out of the 
centre of the tangle.
In Conclusion
Middle-range laws, Elster-type mechanisms, maxims and precepts are fine in science. They 
are more than fine, they are a boon. We do not need to recast them as propositions, we 
do not need to take them literally, we do not need to try to ‘derive’ our conclusions from 
them. We do need to learn how to use them. We do need, as a community, to fill our tool-
box with a big variety of tools and to learn how to use them together to craft reliable fin-
ished products.
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I have set down three elements that make a claim to reliability credible. I expressed 
them in a loose, generic, metaphorical way that provides little guidance about what they 
look like in any particular case. I do not think that is a problem. Evaluating the credibility 
of a model is not an exact science. We may long for probabilities — they sure would help 
with cost-benefit analysis which is why the EBP community is keen on them. But we need 
a chance set-up, like a roulette wheel, to generate probabilities and there are no chance set-
ups in the offing.
Of course this is a highly debated issue which I don’t propose to take on in my con-
cluding paragraphs. What I shall do instead in is to remind you of Neurath’s boat, which is 
apt to my topic. Mauricio Suárez (2019) notes that the focus on practice is a return to the 
good old Vienna Circle Philosophy of Neurath, Hahn, Zilsel and Carnap. We are always 
building —not rebuilding— our ship at sea without ever having been on solid ground to 
start with. Neurath’s point was that we have always to work from where, and with whom, 
we are. We must use the materials we have (Suárez, 2019), the methods and tools we have 
and the practitioners we have. These will generally disagree. That is the human condition. 
There is only the very practices and the very practitioners we have. There is no scientific 
method writ in some Platonic heaven that could show us the way to true claims. There is 
no magic decision procedure we can follow to arrive at best actions. For better or worse, 
there is just us and we must muddle it out.
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